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Smoking and Intertemporal Risk Attitudes
by
Glenn W. Harrison, Andre Hofmeyr, Harold Kincaid, Don Ross and J. Todd Swarthout⌘
December 2018

ABSTRACT
Atemporal risk preferences, time preferences, and intertemporal risk preferences are central
to economic explanations of addiction, but have received little attention in the experimental
economic literature on substance use. We conduct an incentive-compatible experiment
designed to elicit the atemporal risk preferences, time preferences, and intertemporal risk
preferences of a sample of student (n = 145) and staff (n = 111) smokers, ex-smokers, and
non-smokers at the University of Cape Town in 2016-2017. We estimate a structural model
of intertemporal risk preferences jointly with a rank-dependent utility model of choice under
atemporal risk and a quasi-hyperbolic model of time preferences. We find no substantive
differences in atemporal risk preferences according to smoking status, smoking intensity, and
smoking severity, but do find that time preferences have an economically significant
association with smoking behaviour. Smokers discount at a far higher rate than non-smokers,
and ex-smokers discount at a level between these groups. There is also a large, positive
relationship between smoking intensity and discounting behaviour that has important
implications for treatment. The intertemporal risk preferences of our sample exhibit
significant heterogeneity and we find, contrary to the assumption employed by some
economic models, that smokers do not exhibit intertemporal risk seeking behaviour. Instead,
our sample is characterised by high levels of intertemporal risk aversion which varies by
smoking intensity and smoking severity in men, but not in women.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Economic models of addiction highlight the importance of atemporal risk preferences,
time preferences, and intertemporal risk preferences for the onset, persistence, and resolution
of addiction. The relevance of these preferences in the context of addiction is clear: the
consumption of addictive goods occurs under conditions of risk and uncertainty (atemporal
risk preferences); it involves an intertemporal trade-off between current benefits and future
costs (time preferences); and there is serial correlation in addiction outcomes given that
present consumption tends to increase the marginal benefit of future consumption while
simultaneously increasing the risk of a decline in long-term welfare (intertemporal risk
preferences).
Despite the theoretical importance of these preferences, they have received little
attention in the experimental economics literature on addiction. Harrison, Hofmeyr, Ross and
Swarthout (HHRS) [2018] review the experimental literature on atemporal risk preferences,
time preferences, and smoking behaviour, and find that most studies use inappropriate
statistical methods and/or preference elicitation mechanisms that lack incentive compatibility.
Furthermore, we know of no experimental studies that analyse the relationship between
intertemporal risk preferences1 and addiction.
Intertemporal risk aversion refers to any aversion to variability of outcomes over time,
just as atemporal risk aversion refers to any aversion to variability of outcomes at a point in
time. Smoking addictions are often associated with multiple attempts to quit, usually
successfully for a short period of time, accompanied by eventual relapse. It is precisely this
canonical profile of a smoking addict that interacts with attitudes to risk over time. Measures
of risk attitudes at a point in time logically need have no relation at all with risk attitudes over
time. Hence it is critical to differentiate these two measures of risk attitudes to see if risk
attitudes in general play a role in explaining smoking behaviour.

The literature on intertemporal risk preferences emerged from the literature on multi-attribute utility theory
(see Keeney and Raiffa [1976] for a review). A multi-attribute utility function captures the idea that agents may
take into account the multiple characteristics or attributes of a good when making choices. For example, suppose
someone wants to purchase a dishwasher and cares both about the speed with which it finishes its cycle and its
energy efficiency. One machine may be very fast but energy inefficient while another is slower but more
efficient. To represent the person’s preferences over these different attributes one could employ a multi-attribute
utility function. In the context of intertemporal consumption streams, the times at which different goods or
amounts of money are received can be regarded as distinct attributes or characteristics of the consumption
stream. Viewed in this way, preferences over intertemporal consumption streams are modelled naturally using a
multi-attribute utility function.
1
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We evaluate an incentive-compatible experiment designed to elicit the atemporal risk
preferences, time preferences, and intertemporal risk preferences of a sample of student (n =
145) and staff (n = 111) smokers, ex-smokers, and non-smokers at the University of Cape
Town (UCT) in 2016-2017. We adopt the full information maximum likelihood statistical
approach of Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström [2018] to estimate a structural model of
intertemporal risk preferences jointly with a rank-dependent utility (RDU) model of
atemporal risk preferences, due to Quiggin [1982], and a quasi-hyperbolic (QH) model of
time preferences, due to Phelps and Pollak [1968] and Laibson [1997]. We also estimate a
range of alternative specifications to test the robustness of our results.
Our research makes a number of contributions to the literature. First, we replicate the
finding of HHRS that atemporal risk aversion does not differ according to smoking status and
smoking intensity, measured by the number of cigarettes smoked per day, while extending
this null result to a measure of smoking severity, the Fagerström [2012] Test for Cigarette
Dependence. Second, we replicate the finding of economically and statistically significant
differences in the time preferences of smokers and non-smokers and add nuance to this result
by incorporating ex-smokers in the sample: ex-smokers discount at a level between smokers
and non-smokers. Third, we identify a positive relationship between smoking intensity and
discounting behaviour that makes it harder for heavier smokers to quit because the long-term
costs of continuing to smoke and the long-term benefits that result from successful abstention
are discounted heavily. Finally, we identify significant heterogeneity in intertemporal risk
preferences but find, contrary to the assumption employed by some economic models of
addiction, that smokers do not exhibit intertemporal risk-seeking behaviour. Instead, our
sample is characterised by intertemporal risk aversion, which does not differ significantly
according to smoking status, but does differ according to the smoking intensity and smoking
severity of men.
Section 2 discusses the theory of intertemporal risk preferences and their importance
in economic models of addiction. Section 3 describes our experimental design and presents
summary statistics for the sample. Section 4 outlines our statistical approach for jointly
estimating atemporal risk preferences, time preferences, and intertemporal risk preferences,
along with measures of smoking behaviour. Section 5 presents the results and Section 6
concludes.
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2. THEORY
HHRS conduct a detailed review of the literature on atemporal risk preferences, time
preferences, and smoking behaviour so we limit the discussion to the relationship between
intertemporal risk preferences and addiction.
Intertemporal risk preferences are determined by properties of the intertemporal
utility function. Consider the following intertemporal choice model:
n

UU(x0 , x1 , x2 , …) = E &θ '( Dt u(xt ))* ,

(1)

t=0

where u(xt) is the atemporal utility function over money at time t, Dt > 0 is a discount factor
for time horizon t, and θ is the identity function when U(･) is additively separable, but we
allow for departures from this assumption below.2
Richard [1975] is credited with introducing intertemporal risk preferences to the
economic literature, although the concept apparently first appeared in de Finetti [1952].
Richard [1975] basically extended the notion of risk preferences over one variable to risk
preferences over multiple variables and referred to the latter as multivariate risk aversion.3
To flesh out this idea, Table 1 includes two intertemporal lotteries (A and B) that
yield outcomes in two time periods. Under intertemporal lottery A, you flip a coin and if it
lands on heads you receive $50 today and $5 in 14 days, but if it lands on tails you receive $5
today and $50 in 14 days. By contrast, under intertemporal lottery B, you flip a coin and if it
lands on heads you receive $50 today and $50 in 14 days, but if it lands on tails you receive
$5 today and $5 in 14 days. The outcomes in intertemporal lottery A are negatively serially
correlated whereas the outcomes in intertemporal lottery B are positively serially correlated.

The expectation E(･) in (1) typically denotes a probability-weighted average, but to incorporate the possibility
that decision makers subjectively distort objective probabilities, we use E(･) to denote a decision-weighted
average, in the terminology of RDU theory.
3 Researchers in the field of intertemporal risk preferences typically employ the risk averse component of these
preferences in their terminology. Keeney [1973] uses the term “conditional risk aversion,” Richard [1975] refers
to “multivariate risk aversion,” Epstein and Tanny [1980] define “correlation aversion,” Strzalecki [2013]
employs “long-run risk aversion,” and Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström [2018] use “intertemporal risk
aversion” or “intertemporal correlation aversion.” We prefer the term “intertemporal risk preferences” because it
does not presuppose an aversion to lotteries with positive serial correlation.
2
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Table 1
Intertemporal Lotteries and Intertemporal Risk Preferences
State of nature Probability
Heads

0.5

Tails

0.5

Intertemporal
Lottery A
$50 today
and
$5 in 14 days
$5 today
and
$50 in 14 days

Intertemporal
lottery B
$50 today
and
$50 in 14 days
$5 today
and
$5 in 14 days

If a decision maker chooses intertemporal lottery A over intertemporal lottery B this
is evidence of intertemporal risk aversion because, as Richard [1975, p. 12] remarked, “…
the decision maker prefers getting some of the ‘best’ and some of the ‘worst’ to taking a
chance on all of the ‘best’ or all of the ‘worst.’”4 If the decision maker is indifferent between
the lotteries, she is intertemporally risk neutral, and if the decision maker prefers
intertemporal lottery B to intertemporal lottery A this is indicative of intertemporal risk
seeking behaviour.
Richard [1975] shows that the sign of the cross partial derivatives of the intertemporal
utility function determines preferences toward serially correlated lotteries. Specifically, if
∂2U(x)/(∂xt-1∂xt) ≤ 0 in (1) the decision maker is intertemporally risk averse. In words, if the
intertemporal utility function’s cross partial derivative is non-positive then the decision
maker prefers lotteries where the outcomes are negatively serially correlated because the
marginal utility of current consumption is decreasing in past consumption. By contrast, if
∂2U(x)/(∂xt-1∂xt) = 0 the decision maker is intertemporally risk neutral, whereas if
∂2U(x)/(∂xt-1∂xt) ≥ 0 the decision maker is intertemporally risk seeking. Thus, the form of a
decision maker’s intertemporal utility function determines her intertemporal risk preferences,
just as the form of a decision maker’s atemporal utility function determines her atemporal
risk preferences under expected utility theory (EUT).5 Critically, the sign of ∂2U(x)/(∂xt-1∂xt)
has no formal or economic connection to the sign of ∂2U(x)/(∂xt-12) or ∂2U(x)/(∂xt2).

Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström [2018, p. 538] provide another intuitive definition for intertemporal
risk aversion when drawing an analogy between atemporal risk aversion and intertemporal risk aversion: “The
[intertemporally risk] averse individual prefers to have non-extreme payoffs across periods, just as the
[atemporally] risk averse individual prefers to have non-extreme payoffs within periods.”
5 Much as the literature on choice under atemporal risk has evolved to incorporate rank and sign dependence, as
has the literature on intertemporal risk preferences (see Fishburn [1984] and Miyamoto and Wakker [1996]).
4
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The standard model of intertemporal choice in economics employs an additivelyseparable intertemporal utility function, so that θ(･) is the identity function in (1). Additive
separability implies intertemporal risk neutrality because consumption at different points in
time is independent, so the cross partial derivatives of the intertemporal utility function are
necessarily zero. Thus, even though a decision maker may be risk averse, risk neutral or risk
seeking over atemporal lotteries, an additively-separable intertemporal utility function yields
intertemporal risk neutrality.6 Economic models of addiction abandon the additiveseparability assumption to incorporate intertemporal dependencies in the consumption of
addictive goods so it is important to understand the implications of this departure from the
standard model for the intertemporal risk preferences of decision makers.
The first well-known economic model of addiction was developed by Becker and
Murphy (BM) [1988]. This model assumes that agents consume addictive and non-addictive
goods, where consumption of the former increases the decision maker’s stock of addictive
capital. The model also assumes that the agent’s intertemporal utility function is not
additively separable over time in the addictive and non-addictive goods, because their
marginal utilities are influenced by the decision maker’s stock of addictive capital. In other
words, current consumption of an addictive good is affected by past consumption of the
addictive good through changes in a person’s stock of addictive capital. Specifically, the BM
model assumes that higher consumption of the addictive good in the past raises the marginal
utility of present consumption, implying that the more the addict has consumed, the greater
the benefit from consumption now. This is a necessary condition for the addictive good to
capture the property of reinforcement, i.e., greater past consumption leads to greater present
consumption. The sufficient condition for reinforcement is that the benefits from
consumption now must offset the harmful effects which accumulate over time. When these
necessary and sufficient conditions are satisfied, adjacent complementarity holds, which
means that consumption of the addictive good is a complement, rather than a substitute,
across time periods.7 This assumption was central to economic models of addiction in the

The fact that an additively-separable intertemporal utility function yields intertemporal risk neutrality has the
unfortunate implication that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution equals the inverse of atemporal risk
attitudes. In economic models of addiction where the intertemporal utility function is not additively separable,
this link between instantaneous risk attitudes and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is broken (see
Bommier [2007], Bommier, Kochov and Le Grand [2017] and Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström [2018]).
7 Adjacent complementarity implies that anything that affects consumption of the addictive good at one point in
time will affect consumption of the addictive good at all points in time. For example, an expected increase in
future prices will not only decrease consumption when the change comes into effect but will also decrease
consumption in every period leading up to that date. This is an important testable implication of the BM model
that has led to a cottage industry of econometric models which attempt to show that consumers respond to future
6
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tradition that descended from BM, because it provides a rationale for why agents continue to
consume their targets of addiction despite the decline in welfare associated with increases in
the stock of addictive capital.
The BM model and its extensions are special cases of more general models of
consumption habit formation, which, as Bommier and Rochet [2006, p. 725-726] recognise,
place strong restrictions on the intertemporal utility function through the assumption of
adjacent complementarity. Specifically, consumption of the addictive good increases the
stock of addictive capital, and increases in the stock of addictive capital increase the marginal
utility of addictive consumption, ∂2U(x)/(∂xt-1∂xt) > 0, implying that agents in these models
are typically intertemporally risk seeking.8
Psychologists have not generally regarded the BM model as providing an accurate
specification of addiction, precisely because it mispredicts the dynamics of the typical lifecourse of an addiction. Almost all addicts eventually achieve abstinence or controlled,
moderate consumption, and most do so without clinical intervention or therapy (see Heyman
[2009]). According to the BM model this must indicate eventual correction of an initial error
by the addict in forecasting her utility. But this directly conflicts with the fact that most
addicts also achieve recovery only after first experiencing multiple periods of attempts at
control, during which anhedonic costs of withdrawal are fully paid, followed by relapse. It is
perhaps plausible that people make initial forecasting errors preceding addiction. However,
the psychological literature has never endorsed the suggestion that people experience the full
suite of addictive onset, effects, increased tolerance, welfare losses, and withdrawal
symptoms, then repeat their initial forecasting errors, and indeed do so multiple times.9
A more recent wave of economic models of addiction aligns with the general view of
psychologists and psychiatrists that addiction is not “rational” in the sense of BM, that is, that

price changes by adjusting current consumption. For a review of this literature in relation to tobacco smoking
see Chaloupka and Warner [2001]. For critiques of this literature see Ferguson [2000] and Baltagi [2007].
8 Although stochastic economic models of addiction typically assume, sometimes implicitly, that agents are
intertemporally risk seeking, Bommier and Rochet [2006] and Lichtendahl, Chao and Bodily [2012] show that
intertemporal risk aversion is in fact compatible with habit formation.
9 Chaiton et al. [2016] use the longitudinal Ontario Tobacco Survey to estimate the average number of quit
attempts it takes to quit smoking successfully. They evaluate four different statistical methods and find that the
average number of quit attempts is 6.1 using the standard cross-sectional “recalled lifetime quit attempts”
metric. This average rises to 30 quit attempts using their preferred method (Method 3) to estimate the
probability of a successful quit attempt on the basis of observed quit rates.
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it necessarily implies intertemporal and perhaps even synchronous, preference ambivalence.10
The influence of these newer modelling approaches has not been substantially absorbed in the
economic literature on addiction regulation and taxation. This no doubt partly represents
normal dissemination lag, but it likely also reflects the fact that there is not yet a canonical
general economic model on which theorists have converged. This in turn reflects the fact that
where there is consensus among psychologists on the underlying general mechanisms of
addictive learning, these mechanisms are not characterized in terms of choice, rational or
otherwise. As Heyman [2009] argues, this is does not imply that addictive consumption is not
chosen. The point is rather that there is at present no generally accepted model of addictive
choice that is regarded as best fitting the comprehensive body of clinical and other
observations.
In general, psychologists do not view addiction as a variety of habit formation, in
either the everyday sense or in the economist’s technical sense. Certainly addicts often form
habits, for example, in being willing to pay costs to stick to their usual brand of cigarettes.
And furthermore, familiar experiences associated with such habits can cue addictive cravings
through mechanisms of associative learning. But addiction is not regarded by psychologists
or clinicians as a kind of habit.11
Therefore, whereas the BM model and its refinements (see Orphanides and Zervos
[1995] and Gruber and Köszegi [2001]), predict intertemporal risk seeking, the more recent
“behavioural” models are agnostic about the intertemporal risk preferences of addicts. This
relationship needs to be investigated empirically, in the context of general theories of choice
under uncertainty. We provide such an investigation.

Examples of such models are Laibson [2001], Loewenstein, O’Donoghue and Rabin [2003], Bénabou and
Tirole [2004], Benhabib and Bisin [2004], Bernheim and Rangel [2004], Fudenberg and Levine [2006; 2011;
2012], and Gul and Pesendorfer [2007].
11 Addiction arises when the simple conditioned learning system implemented in the primitive ventral striatum
of the brain, that humans share with other mammals, learns that a stereotyped action sequence (e.g., taking out
the cigarette pack, taking out the cigarette, lighting it) reliably produces a strong reward that the brain perceives
as varying stochastically across the whole estimation interval that the system scans. This sets a prediction
problem for it that the system cannot solve. But the brain cannot stop trying to solve this prediction problem
given a behaviourally or perceptually associated cue. The stereotyped behaviour sequences might be regarded as
a kind of habit. But this is not habitual consumption of the kind associated in economic models with
intertemporal risk seeking behaviour.
10
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3. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND SUMMARY STATISTICS
After receiving ethics approval and permission to access students and staff at UCT,
we sent out emails describing the study to all students and approximately 20% of staff
members.12 Given our interest in smoking behaviour the emails included a web link to an
online, sign-up survey that contained the following three questions about smoking: 1) “Have
you ever smoked cigarettes?” (Yes/No); 2) “If you answered Yes to question 1), have you
smoked at least 100 cigarettes in your life?” (Yes/No); 3) “If you answered Yes to question
1), do you currently smoke cigarettes, occasionally or regularly?” (Yes/No). A pool of over
2,000 students and 220 staff members completed the sign-up survey to take part in the study.
We sampled from the student and staff groups separately, and the two groups were never
mixed within a given laboratory session.
For students, we defined two groups from which to randomly select study
participants: a smoker group (defined by answering yes to questions 1, 2, and 3 above) of
approximately 500 people, and a group of approximately 1,000 people comprising exsmokers (defined by answering yes to questions 1 and 2 but no to question 3) and nonsmokers (defined by answering no to question 1).13 Those people who were randomly
selected to take part in the study (260 smokers and 160 ex-smokers and non-smokers) were
added to a dedicated, restricted-access site on the university’s virtual learning environment
which allowed them to sign up for an experimental session that did not conflict with their
academic timetable. A total of 8 sessions were conducted with students between November
2016 and March 2017. Given the limited number of staff members who applied to take part in
the study, all of the 220 people who filled in the sign-up survey were added to a dedicated,
restricted-access site on the university’s virtual learning environment so that they could sign
up for an experimental session that suited their work schedule. These 5 sessions were
conducted in August 2017. In total, we recruited and processed 256 subjects: 145 students
and 111 staff members.

UCT prevents researchers from emailing all staff members (approximately 6,700 people) because they do not
want staff to be inundated with requests to participate in research studies. Consequently, researchers are given a
spreadsheet containing basic information on all staff members, e.g., faculty, pay class, gender, etc., and are
instructed to select approximately 20% of the people on the spreadsheet so that emails can be sent out to them.
We were advised not to select staff members in the lowest pay classes (pay classes 1 – 4) because they do not
have regular access to email, and we chose not to include any staff members from UCT’s satellite campuses.
Random selection of the remaining staff members produced the 20% sample that was used for recruitment.
13 There were approximately 600 students who answered yes to question 1 but no to question 2. They were
excluded from the sampling frame so that we could focus on smokers, ex-smokers who had smoked more than
100 cigarettes, and non-smokers who had never smoked cigarettes.
12
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The experiment took place in a computer lab at UCT which had been set up to run the
experimental software developed by us, which is discussed in more detail below. Subjects
were separated by partitions and were asked not to talk to each other during the session. We
employed a team of three research assistants (RAs) to help run the sessions, administer
payments, and answer questions.
Upon arrival at the lab, subjects were randomly allocated to a computer terminal and
were asked to read and sign a consent form. When everyone had signed the consent form, an
RA went through a short presentation14 which provided a description of what would take
place in the session. At the end of the introductory presentation, subjects were asked to read
atemporal risk preference task instructions and to raise their hands when they were finished.
When a subject raised her hand, an RA asked the subject to put on a set of headphones and
watch a video15 that we developed to further explain the task and familiarise the participant
with the screen-based, decision-making environment. This approach was adopted for all of
the tasks: subjects received written and audio-visual instructions and were required to go
through both of them before completing the task. After finishing the atemporal risk
preference task video, the subject raised her hand and was then allowed to complete the task.
After completing the choice task itself, the subject rolled two 10-sided dice to randomly
select one of the choices that was made, and then rolled the two 10-sided dice again to
resolve the chosen lottery. An RA recorded the subject’s earnings for the task on a payment
receipt that would be used to determine the subject’s final earnings at the end of the
experimental session.
The subject was then asked to read the written instructions for the time preference
task before proceeding to the audio-visual instructions.16 When the video was finished, the
subject completed the task and then rolled a 20-sided die and a 4-sided die to randomly select
one of the choices that was made. An RA recorded this amount and the payment date on the
subject’s payment receipt.
Following the completion of the time preference task, subjects read through
instructions for the intertemporal risk preference task before watching the audio-visual

Appendix A includes the introductory presentation, the atemporal risk preference task instructions, the time
preference task instructions, and the intertemporal risk preference task instructions.
15 See https://www.dropbox.com/s/ymnt3brtldrxv2m/Risk_Demo.mp4?dl=0.
16 See https://www.dropbox.com/s/rzmvbetpzabd6d0/Time_Demo.mp4?dl=0.
14
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instructions.17 After completing the task, the subject rolled a 4-sided die and a 10-sided die to
randomly select one of the choices that was made, and an RA recorded the amounts and
payment dates for this choice on the subject’s payment receipt.
Subjects then completed a task that elicited their subjective beliefs about the mortality
risks of smoking. After reading through and watching audio-visual instructions explaining the
task, subjects responded to 10 questions, e.g., “For adults 35 years of age and older, what
percentage of deaths from lung cancer are associated with smoking in the United States
between 2005 and 2009?”18
When a subject had finished all four tasks, she then completed a questionnaire on the
computer which included 10 questions on demographic and socio-economic characteristics as
well as a number of modules designed to gather information on smoking behaviour and other
potentially co-occurring mental disorders, e.g., anxiety, depression, and alcohol use disorder.
With regard to smoking behaviour, we included the tobacco and nicotine use module from
the National Epidemiological Survey on Alcohol and Related Conditions (NESARC)
described by Grant and Dawsom [2006]; the Fagerström Test for Cigarette Dependence
(FTCD) described by Heatherton, Kozlowski, Frecker and Fagerström [1991] and Fagerström
[2012]; and the diagnostic criteria for tobacco use disorder and tobacco withdrawal in the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition (DSM-5) documented in
American Psychiatric Association [2013].
While subjects completed the questionnaire, an RA determined their total earnings for
all of the tasks. All subjects received a show-up fee of R40. The show-up fee together with
earnings for the atemporal risk preference task and subjective beliefs task were paid out
immediately in cash, and earnings for the time preference task and intertemporal risk
preference task were paid out on the dates corresponding to the subject’s choices on the
randomly selected questions. Delayed payments were effected via electronic transfer and
subjects received a payment notification on their cell phones as soon as the transfers took
place. Such transfers are a common means of payment in South Africa and were used to
reduce the transaction costs which subjects would have had to incur by coming to collect
their delayed payments from us. Experimental sessions lasted approximately 1.5 hours and

17
18

See https://www.dropbox.com/s/qphnjz6z04a13lw/Risk_and_Time_Demo.mp4?dl=0.
The subjective beliefs task is not the focus of our analysis.
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subjects earned R920 (roughly $150 at purchasing power parity (PPP) at the time) on
average.
A. Atemporal Risk Preference Task
The atemporal risk preference task interface was based on Hey and Orme [1994]. It
presented subjects with a choice between two lotteries on a screen, displayed in Figure 1 as
pie charts with accompanying text that listed the probabilities and monetary amounts of the
prizes. Subjects made 90 choices in the task and then rolled dice to randomly select one
choice for payment.

Figure 1: Risk Preference Task Interface
The 90 lottery pairs were drawn from the designs of Wakker, Erev and Weber [1994],
Loomes and Sugden [1998], Cox and Sadiraj [2008, p. 33], and Harrison, Martínez-Correa
and Swarthout [2015]. These lottery pairs were chosen to provide good coverage of the
probability space, to facilitate the estimation of non-EUT models of choice under atemporal
risk, to investigate the calibration puzzle of Hansson [1988] and Rabin [2000], and to
determine whether subjects satisfy the reduction of compound lotteries axiom.19 Each lottery
pair was drawn randomly, without replacement, from this battery and presented to subjects

Appendix B includes a detailed discussion of the lottery pairs that were used in the atemporal risk preference
task.
19
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sequentially. The task used prize magnitudes between R0 and R700 ($0 - $112 at PPP) and
probabilities which varied in increments of 0.05 between 0 and 1.
B. Time Preference Task
The time preference task presented subjects with choices between smaller, sooner
(SS) and larger, later (LL) rewards, illustrated in Figure 2. On each screen subjects made 4
choices before proceeding to the next screen. The principal (i.e., SS reward) and time horizon
were fixed on each screen but varied across screens. A calendar was displayed on every
screen to show subjects when they would receive the amounts of money they chose.

Figure 2: Time Preference Task Interface
Following Coller and Williams [1999], two front end delays (FEDs) to the SS rewards
were used: zero days and 7 days. This design allows one to hold subjective transaction costs
constant for the SS and LL rewards at the positive 7-day FED. It also facilitates estimation of
the parameters of a QH or β-δ discounting function, because the zero-day FED allows one to
pin down the estimate of β, which captures a “passion for the present” or “present-bias” in
decision making, whereas the 7-day FED allows one to then identify the long-term
discounting parameter δ.20 Subjects in an experimental session were exposed to both of these
FED treatments.
Two principals (R250 and R400; $40 and $64 at PPP), four time horizons (7, 14, 42,
To easily distinguish between the two parameters of the QH discounting model, we refer to the “present-bias”
discounting parameter β and the “long-term” discounting parameter δ.
20
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and 84 days), and nominal annual interest rates between 5% and 250% were used in the time
preference task. These parameters, together with the FEDs, define a battery of 224 possible
choice pairs. Each subject made 60 choices in the task which were drawn randomly, without
replacement, from this battery. At the end of the time preference task, the subject rolled dice
to randomly select one of these choices for payment.
C. Intertemporal Risk Preference Task
The intertemporal risk preference task interface was based on Andersen, Harrison,
Lau and Rutström [2018]. On each screen, illustrated by Figure 3, it presented subjects with a
choice between two risky profiles of outcomes that were paid out at different points in time
(viz., intertemporal lotteries). Probabilities were communicated by text and pie charts, prizes
were listed numerically, and the dates on which the prizes would be paid out were displayed
in text and on a calendar.

Figure 3: Intertemporal Risk Preference Task Interface
The pairs of intertemporal lotteries were structured in the following way. For a
particular pair, lottery A assigned a probability of, say, 0.1 to receiving a larger amount Lt at
time t and a smaller amount St+τ at time t+τ (Lt, St+τ) and a probability of 0.9 to receiving the
smaller amount St at time t and the larger amount Lt+τ at time t+τ (St, Lt+τ). Lottery B, by
contrast, assigned a probability of 0.1 to receiving Lt and Lt+τ and a probability of 0.9 to
receiving St and St+τ. In this example, lottery A is the “safe” intertemporal lottery because the
subject always earns L + S, whereas lottery B is the “risky” intertemporal lottery because the
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subject either earns 2L or 2S. We constructed 40 of these intertemporal lotteries, broken
down into 4 sets of 10, with prizes St = St+τ and Lt = Lt+τ in each set. Each set of 10
intertemporal lotteries included prizes with probability p(Lt, St+τ) = p(Lt, Lt+τ) starting at 0.1,
and increasing by 0.1 until the last choice was between two degenerate intertemporal
lotteries. Using the example above, the last choice in this set was between lottery A that pays
(Lt, St+τ) with certainty and lottery B that pays (Lt, Lt+τ) with certainty; lottery B clearly
dominates lottery A in this pair and is a test of subject comprehension or monotonicity of
preferences.
To construct our battery of intertemporal lotteries, we used a 7-day FED to the sooner
reward, two time horizons of 14 days and 42 days between the rewards, and the following
two sets of larger (L) amounts and smaller (S) amounts: (R450, R20; $72, $3 at PPP) and
(R260, R10; $42, $1.50 at PPP). Each intertemporal lottery pair was drawn at random,
without replacement, from this battery and presented to subjects sequentially. The order in
which the intertemporal lotteries appeared (i.e., whether the “safe” lottery appeared as the
“Top” choice or the “Bottom” choice in Figure 3) varied randomly across screens. At the end
of the task, the subject rolled dice to randomly select one choice for payment.
D. Summary Statistics
Table 2 presents summary statistics for the sample of 256 subjects. The average age in
the sample is approximately 30 years old, 27% of the sample is White21, 43% is male, and,
coincidentally, 43% of the sample is made up of staff. Subjects were asked to rate their
current financial situation on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 represented “very broke” and 5
represented “in very good shape.” The mean response of 2.80 implies that, on average,
subjects were neither broke nor in good shape at the time of their experimental session. Nonsmokers make up 52% of the sample, ex-smokers constitute 12% of the sample, and smokers
comprise the remaining 36% of the sample.22

Designation of population groups or “races” follows the traditional categorisation in South Africa that is still
employed in affirmative action and related policies, notwithstanding recognition that it involves cultural and
historical discriminations that are without biological significance. Approximately 30% of the sample is Black
and 31% is Coloured, a culturally salient population group in South Africa composed of individuals of mainly
Malaysian and Indonesian descent who speak Afrikaans as a first language. Of the remaining sample, 9% is
Indian and 3% preferred not to classify their race.
22 According to The Tobacco Atlas (see www.tobaccoatlas.org and Drope et al. [2018]) 26.5% of men and 5.5%
of women smoke tobacco daily in South Africa. The prevalence rate for men is lower than in other medium Human
Development Index (HDI) countries but the prevalence rate for women is higher than in other medium-HDI
countries. Prevalence rates for selected high-income countries are: US – men: 14.4%, women: 11.7%; UK – men:
19.9%, women: 18.1%; Australia – men: 15.6%, women: 13.3%; Germany – men: 25.1%, women: 17.1%.
21
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An estimate from the South African National Health and Nutrition Examination
Survey of the mean number of cigarettes smoked per day by current smokers in South Africa
is 7.4. For people residing in the Western Cape, where the present study was conducted, the
mean is 8.5 (see Shisana et al. [2013, p. 114-115]). The smokers in our study reported the
average number of cigarettes they typically smoked in a day, and the mean across all
responses was 8.129 with a standard deviation of 5.317.
Table 2
Summary Statistics
Variable
Demographics
Age
White
Male
Financial situation today
Staff
Non-smoker
Ex-smoker
Current smoker
FTCD score
Average cigarettes per day
Treatments - Time Preferences
FED: 0 days
FED: 7 days
High Principal

Mean

Standard
Deviation

29.948
0.266
0.434
2.840
0.434
0.520
0.117
0.363
2.495
8.129

11.887
0.443
0.497
1.041
0.497
0.501
0.322
0.482
2.119
5.317

0.502
0.498
0.501

0.500
0.500
0.500

Smokers also completed the FTCD, which is a measure of smoking severity that
scores people on a scale of 0 to 10, with higher numbers indicating greater severity. The
average FTCD score among smokers is 2.495 with a standard deviation of 2.119.23 In the
experimental literature on atemporal risk preferences, time preferences, and smoking
behaviour, reviewed in detail by HHRS, researchers often try to maximise the difference
between smokers and non-smokers by selecting heavy smokers to take part in the study, e.g.,
at least 20 cigarettes smoked per day for the last 5 years and a FTCD score of at least 6 in
Bickel, Odum and Madden [1999]. We recruited smokers across the entire spectrum of
severity to determine whether being a smoker, irrespective of intensity, is associated with
Fagerström and Furberg [2008] compare smokers’ FTCD scores using nationally-representative studies in 13
countries and find that these scores range from 2.8 to 4.6. FTCD scores are highest in Sweden and the United
States and lowest in Germany and Norway.
23
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atemporal risk preferences, time preferences, and intertemporal risk preferences. This also
allows us to explore the relationship between atemporal risk preferences, time preferences,
intertemporal risk preferences, and smoking intensity.
Table 2 shows that randomisation in the time preference task ensured that FED
treatments were split evenly across the sample, and 50% of choices in the time preference
task involved the high principal of R400.
4. ECONOMETRICS
We adopt the statistical approach of Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström [2018] to
estimate the parameters of an intertemporal utility function24 jointly with the parameters
defining atemporal risk preferences and time preferences.
Our intertemporal risk preference experiment used intertemporal lotteries that paid
out amounts of money at two different points in time. Taking this into account, (1) can be
simplified as follows
UU(xt , xt+τ ) = E+θ,Dt u(xt ) + Dt+τ u(xt+τ )-..

(2)

To admit the possibility that the intertemporal utility function is not additively
separable, we use a power function for θ(･):
θ,Dt u(xt ) + Dt+τ u(xt+τ )- = ,Dt u(xt ) + Dt+τ u(xt+τ )-

ρ

(3)

where θ(z) = ln z if ρ = 0, and θ(z) = –zρ if ρ < 0, following Wakker [2008]. With this power
function specification, ρ = 1 yields the standard additively-separable model and intertemporal
risk neutrality, ρ < 1 denotes intertemporal risk aversion, and ρ > 1 represents intertemporal
risk seeking behaviour.
The intertemporal lotteries in our experiment only had two possible states of nature.
Consider the “safe” intertemporal lottery A where the decision maker receives (Lt, St+τ) with
probability p and (St, Lt+τ) with probability 1 – p. Given the assumption that θ(z) = zρ, the
stochastic discounted utility (SDU) of intertemporal lottery A is
SDUA = ω(p) × [Dt u(Lt) + Dt+τ u(St+τ)]ρ + [1 – ω(p)] × [Dt u(St) + Dt+τ u(Lt+τ)]ρ,

(4)

The term “intertemporal utility function” encompasses both deterministic and stochastic choice contexts. To
emphasise the stochastic nature of our intertemporal risk preference task, we instead use the term “stochastic
discounted utility” below.
24
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where ω : p → [0, 1] with ωʹ(p) > 0. Apart from the specific functional form for θ(･),
equation (4) is completely general because we have not made any parametric assumptions
about u(･), Dt, and ω(･).
Now consider the “risky” intertemporal lottery B where the decision maker receives
(Lt, Lt+τ) with probability p and (St, St+τ) with probability 1 – p. The SDU of intertemporal
lottery B is
SDUB = ω(p) × [Dt u(Lt) + Dt+τ u(Lt+τ)]ρ + [1 – ω(p)] × [Dt u(St) + Dt+τ u(St+τ)]ρ.

(5)

To write out the likelihood function for the choices the subjects made and estimate the
parameters of the SDU model, we need to parameterise the functions u(･), Dt, and ω(･). We
consider the simplest case of EUT and exponential discounting first, and then discuss
extensions to non-EUT and non-exponential specifications.
Under EUT, ω(p) = p, and under exponential discounting DEt = 1 / (1 + δ)t. We let
atemporal utility be defined by a power utility function that displays constant relative risk
aversion
u(x) = xr,

(6)

where u(x) = ln x if r = 0, and u(x) = –xr if r < 0.
With these assumptions, we can jointly estimate the atemporal risk preference
parameter r, the time preference parameter δ, and the intertemporal risk preference parameter
ρ by forming a latent ∇SDU index that captures the difference in the stochastic discounted
utility of intertemporal lotteries A and B. We adopt the contextual utility behavioural error
specification of Wilcox [2011] and define the latent index as
∇SDU = [(SDUB – SDUA) / λ] / ψ,

(7)

where ψ is a behavioural error term for the intertemporal risk preference task and the term λ
normalises the difference in SDU of intertemporal lotteries A and B to lie within the unit
interval.
The likelihood of the intertemporal risk preference choices, conditional on the SDU
specification being true, depends on the estimates of r, μ, δ, υ, ρ, and ψ, where μ is a
behavioural error term for the atemporal risk preference task and υ is a behavioural error term
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for the time preference task, just as ψ is the behavioural error term for the intertemporal risk
preference task. The conditional log-likelihood is
ln L(r, μ, δ, υ, ρ, ψ; c, X) = ∑i[(ln Λ(∇SDU × I(ci = 1)) + (ln Λ(∇SDU × I(ci = 0))],

(8)

where ci = 1(0) denotes the choice of intertemporal lottery B(A) in intertemporal risk
preference task i, Λ is the logistic cumulative distribution function, and X is a vector of
individual characteristics capturing smoking status, gender, age, etc.
The joint likelihood of the atemporal risk preference, time preference, and
intertemporal risk preference responses can then be written as
ln L(r, μ, δ, υ, ρ, ψ; c, X) = ln LARP + ln LTP + ln LSDU,

(9)

where ln LARP is the conditional log-likelihood of the atemporal risk preference choices, ln
LTP is the conditional log-likelihood of the time preference choices, and ln LSDU is defined by
(8).
It is straightforward to extend (9) to incorporate non-EUT models of choice under
atemporal risk and non-exponential discounting specifications. For example, in the case of
QH discounting, we replace DEt = 1 / (1 + δ)t with DQHt = β / (1 + δ)t. We then form the latent
∇SDU index in (7) and proceed as before with one additional parameter (β) to estimate in (9).
5. RESULTS
We estimate the SDU model (9) jointly with the parameters defining atemporal risk
preferences and time preferences. Based on analyses of the atemporal risk preference data
and time preference data, we extend the econometric specification in (9) to incorporate a
RDU model of choice under atemporal risk and a QH model of time preferences. This
specification is then used to analyse the relationship between atemporal risk preferences, time
preferences, intertemporal risk preferences, and three measures of smoking behaviour:
smoking status; smoking intensity, measured by the number of cigarettes smoked per day;
and smoking severity, measured by smokers’ scores on the FTCD.
A. Baseline Estimates
We estimate the homogenous preference SDU model (9) under the assumptions that
EUT characterises choice under atemporal risk and that discounting is exponential; Table C1
in the appendix presents the results. The estimate of the atemporal risk preference parameter r
= 0.409, which is significantly less than 1 (p < 0.001), implies that the sample is moderately
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risk averse, whereas the estimate of the exponential discounting parameter δ = 0.782
indicates that future rewards are discounted at the relatively high rate of 78.2% per annum.
The estimate of the intertemporal risk preference parameter ρ is –1.043, which is significantly
less than 1 (p < 0.001), and shows that the sample is characterised by a high level of
intertemporal risk aversion. Recall that when ρ = 1, the SDU model is additively separable,
which implies intertemporal risk neutrality. Thus, our results show that the most common
model of intertemporal choice in economics, viz., the additively-separable model, is not an
accurate description of the intertemporal risk preferences of our sample. This echoes the
result in Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström [2018] but with a higher level of
intertemporal risk aversion in our sample.25
HHRS emphasise the importance of appropriately characterising a sample’s atemporal
risk attitudes when drawing inferences about its discounting behaviour because, as Andersen,
Harrison, Lau and Rutström [2008] showed, estimates of utility function curvature
significantly affect estimates of discounting parameters. Under EUT, atemporal risk
preferences are determined solely by the curvature of the utility function over outcomes,
whereas under RDU atemporal risk preferences are determined jointly by the curvature of the
utility function and the probability weighting function (PWF). This implies that if there is
evidence of probability weighting in a sample then this needs to be taken into account when
estimating time preference models or else this probability-weighting source of atemporal risk
preferences will show up in the curvature of the utility function under EUT and bias
discounting parameter estimates.
This logic extends naturally to the SDU model because it is estimated jointly with the
parameters defining atemporal risk preferences and time preferences. Consequently, it is
important to accurately identify atemporal risk preferences and time preferences when
estimating a SDU model because these atemporal risk preference and time preference
estimates propagate into inferences drawn from the SDU model. We therefore investigate
whether there is evidence of non-EUT and non-exponential discounting in our data so that the
SDU model can be extended to incorporate these features.

Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström [2018] use the following functional form for u(･) and θ(･) in their
structural econometric model: u(x) = x1 – r / (1 – r) and θ(z) = z1 – ρ / (1 – ρ). Their estimates are not directly
comparable to ours because we use power functions for u(･) and θ(･). Estimating our model on their data, the
estimate of ρ is 0.563, and implies far lower levels of intertemporal risk aversion than we find in our sample.
25
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We begin by estimating EUT and RDU models of choice under atemporal risk; see
Table C2 in the appendix for the results. A crucial ingredient of a RDU model is the
specification of the PWF. Owing to its flexibility, we use the Prelec [1998] function
π(p) = exp[ -η(-ln p)φ],

(10)

which is defined for 1 > p > 0, η > 0 and φ > 0. This function nests a power PWF when η = 1,
and it nests a one-parameter function when φ = 1 that admits linear, inverse S-shaped, and Sshaped forms.
Figure 4 graphs the estimates of the Prelec PWF from the RDU model in Table C2
along with the implied decision weights for 2, 3, and 4 outcome equi-probable reference
lotteries.26 We cannot reject the hypothesis that η = 1, but the estimate of φ = 0.629 is
significantly less than 1 (p < 0.001), which yields an inverse S-shaped PWF with
overweighting of low probabilities and underweighting of moderate to high probabilities.27
For 3-outcome and 4-outcome reference lotteries, this form of probability weighting implies
decision weights for the highest and lowest ranked lottery prizes that exceed the
corresponding probabilities, and decision weights for intermediate prizes that are less than the
corresponding probabilities. This subjective distortion of objective probabilities leads to a
statistically significant increase (p < 0.001) in the estimate of r = 0.553 under the RDU model
compared to the estimate of r = 0.408 under the EUT model. In turn, this increase in the
power function parameter r under RDU leads to a statistically significant increase (p < 0.001)
in the estimate of the exponential discount rate δ = 1.192 compared to the estimate of δ =
0.785 under EUT; Table C3 in the appendix presents the results from exponential discounting
models under the assumption that either EUT or RDU characterises choice under atemporal
risk. Thus the statistically significant evidence of probability weighting has an economically
significant impact on estimates of the exponential discount rate. This again demonstrates the

An equi-probable reference lottery is one where the probabilities assigned to prizes are equal. Thus, in the
case of a 2-outcome equi-probable reference lottery, each prize has a probability of 0.5. For a 3-outcome equiprobable reference lottery, each prize has a probability of 0.30; and for a 4-outcome equi-probable reference
lottery, each prize has a probability of 0.25. The dashed lines in the right panel of Figure 4 represent these
reference probabilities: 0.25, 0.33, and 0.5.
27 Table C2 shows that the sample as a whole is better characterised by RDU than EUT, but this does not imply
that every person in our sample probability weights and, therefore, departs from EUT. Figure C1 in the appendix
shows the results from an individual-level analysis where we estimate EUT and RDU specifications for each
subject and then test whether ω(p) = p in the RDU model. Using a 5% level of statistical significance, we cannot
reject the hypothesis that ω(p) = p for 57% of the sample, implying that at least half of the people in our study
are better characterised by EUT than RDU. However, the remaining 43% of the sample exhibits statistically
significant evidence of nonlinear probability weighting. As we show, it is necessary to take this probability
weighting into account when drawing inferences about time preferences and intertemporal risk preferences at
the level of the sample of subjects.
26
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importance of correctly characterising atemporal risk preferences when estimating time
preferences.
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Figure 4: Estimated Probability Weighting Function and Implied Decision Weights
Similarly, we find statistically significant evidence of non-exponential discounting
when estimating a QH discounting function jointly with a RDU model; Table C4 in the
appendix presents the results. Our estimate of β is 0.960, and is significantly less than 1 (p <
0.001), which generates declining discount rates over time and a significantly (p < 0.001)
lower estimate of the long-term discount rate δ = 0.885 compared to the estimate of δ = 1.192
under the assumption of exponential discounting.
In sum, analyses of the atemporal risk preference data and time preference data
suggest that we should estimate our SDU model jointly with a RDU model to incorporate
nonlinear probability weighting in choice under atemporal risk, and a QH discounting model
to account for a present-bias in intertemporal decision making. Table 3 presents the results
from this model.
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Table 3
Intertemporal Risk Preference ML Estimates
RDU, Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting
Homogenous Preferences
Model
Estimate
Atemporal Risk Preferences
Power function parameter (r)
0.522***
(0.019)
PWF parameter (φ)
0.716***
(0.019)
PWF parameter (η)
1.027***
(0.028)
Error (μ)
0.140***
(0.005)
Time Preferences
Discounting parameter (β)
0.961***
(0.003)
Discounting parameter (δ)
0.840***
(0.066)
Error (υ)
0.874***
(0.140)
Intertemporal Risk Preferences
Power function parameter (ρ)
-0.644***
(0.218)
Error (ψ)
0.286***
(0.022)
N
48640
log-likelihood
-28351.110
Results account for clustering at the individual level
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
The atemporal risk preference estimates indicate a moderate level of utility function
curvature and statistically significant evidence of inverse S-shaped probability weighting.
The time preference results show that there is a discontinuous β = 0.961 drop in the value of a
reward if it is not available immediately but this drop asymptotes toward the long-term
discount rate δ = 0.840 over time. With regard to intertemporal risk preferences, there is a
marked and statistically significant (p < 0.001) increase in the estimate of ρ = -0.644 in Table
3 relative to the estimate of ρ = -1.043 under the assumptions of EUT and exponential
discounting; see Table C1 in the appendix. These results show that in a joint estimation
framework, atemporal risk preference, time preference, and intertemporal risk preference
estimates are inextricably linked. Hence, correct specification of the constituent parts of a
SDU model is necessary for valid statistical inference. We therefore analyse the relationship
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between atemporal risk preferences, time preferences, intertemporal risk preferences, and
smoking behaviour using the statistical specification in Table 3. We also estimate alternative
specifications to test the robustness of our results.
B. Smoking Status
HHRS, using a sample of 175 UCT students in 2012, find that atemporal risk
preferences do not differ as a function of smoking status but do find that smokers discount
the future significantly more heavily than non-smokers. We evaluate these findings with a
larger sample of UCT students and staff that has more variation in demographic and socioeconomic characteristics. In addition, we specifically recruited ex-smokers so as to draw
comparisons between smokers, ex-smokers, and non-smokers. Finally, our experiment
elicited intertemporal risk preferences so we can analyse the relationship between smoking
status and the curvature of the intertemporal power function parameter ρ in our SDU model.
Table D1 in the appendix presents results from the SDU model under the assumptions
that a RDU model with a power utility function and the Prelec PWF characterise choice
under atemporal risk, and that discounting is QH. We allow the parameters of the model to
vary as a linear function of smoking status, demographics, and socio-economic
characteristics. There are no statistically significant differences in the atemporal risk
preferences of smokers, ex-smokers, and non-smokers, which accords with the findings of
HHRS. This result is robust to the assumptions that EUT characterises choice under
atemporal risk and that discounting is exponential.28
With regard to time preferences, the estimate of δSmokers is 0.356, and implies that
smokers discount at a significantly higher rate than non-smokers (p < 0.001). This difference
in discounting behaviour is economically significant: the long-term discount rate of smokers
is 36 percentage points higher than non-smokers. The comparable results in Table E1 show
that under the assumptions of EUT and exponential discounting, smokers discount at a 32
percentage point higher rate than non-smokers. By contrast, there are no statistically
significant differences in the long-term δ discounting behaviour of ex-smokers and nonAppendix E presents the results of a comparable set of SDU models assuming EUT and exponential
discounting as opposed to RDU and QH discounting. The results in appendices D and E are similar and
differences are noted where necessary. Table E1 shows that the atemporal risk preference parameter estimate for
smokers is 0.033, and is significantly higher (p = 0.067) than the estimate for non-smokers. This result is not
economically significant and is a product of the covariance of estimates in a joint estimation framework.
Analyses of the atemporal risk preference data alone show that there are no statistically significant differences in
the atemporal risk preferences of smokers, ex-smokers, and non-smokers under EUT and RDU specifications.
28
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smokers (p = 0.440) and of smokers and ex-smokers (p = 0.161). Moreover, there are no
statistically significant differences between smokers, ex-smokers, and non-smokers in terms
of present-bias β.
Figure 5 shows a kernel-weighted local polynomial regression, with a 95%
confidence interval, of the fraction of LL choices by smokers, ex-smokers, and non-smokers
at the nominal annual interest rates in the time preference task. At each interest rate, the
estimate of smokers’ LL choice fraction is far below that of non-smokers, and the 95%
confidence intervals do not overlap, implying that smokers discount the future at a
significantly higher rate than non-smokers. By contrast, the estimates and 95% confidence
intervals for ex-smokers overlap with those of smokers and non-smokers, suggesting that exsmokers discount at a level between smokers and non-smokers. Figure 5 provides visual
confirmation of the results in Table D1.
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Figure 5: Fraction of LL Choices by Smoking Status
Figure 6 shows a kernel density plot of the intertemporal risk preference parameter ρ,
based on predictions of ρ for each subject using the covariate estimates in Table D1. The
distribution is skewed towards high levels of intertemporal risk aversion and exhibits
significant heterogeneity according to demographic and socio-economic characteristics. The
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coefficient estimate of ρ for men is 0.841 (p < 0.05) and implies that they are significantly
less intertemporally risk averse than women. There is also a strong association between a
subject’s financial situation on the day of the experiment and estimates of intertemporal risk
aversion. Specifically, every one category improvement on the financial situation scale is
associated with a 0.611 (p < 0.05) increase in intertemporal risk aversion, implying that
subjects in better financial situations are more intertemporally risk averse than subjects in
worse financial situations. Of course, this is correlation: we are agnostic about causation.
There are no statistically significant differences in intertemporal risk preferences between
smokers and ex-smokers or between smokers and non-smokers, but ex-smokers are
significantly more intertemporally risk averse than non-smokers at the 10% level. This latter
result is not robust to the assumption that EUT and exponential discounting characterise
atemporal risk preferences and time preferences, respectively; see Table E1 in the appendix.
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Figure 6: Distribution of the Intertemporal Risk Preference Parameter (ρ)
In sum, the sample is characterised by a high degree of heterogeneity in intertemporal
risk preferences that varies as a function of gender and financial situation but not by smoking
status. The analyses in this section suggest that the only robust behavioural difference
between smokers, ex-smokers, and non-smokers appears to be in their long-term discounting
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behaviour, with smokers discounting the most, non-smokers discounting the least, and exsmokers discounting at a level between the two other groups.
C. Smoking Intensity and Smoking Severity
Given the historical differences in smoking prevalence for men and women29,
together with the statistically and economically significant difference in their intertemporal
risk preferences, we split the sample by gender to analyse the relationship between atemporal
risk preferences, time preferences, intertemporal risk preferences, and measures of smoking
intensity and smoking severity.
Table 4 presents results from the SDU model estimated jointly with a RDU model,
power utility function, and Prelec PWF for choice under atemporal risk, and a QH
discounting function. Following HHRS, we investigate whether there is a relationship
between smoking intensity, measured by the number of cigarettes smoked per day, and
atemporal risk preferences, time preferences, and intertemporal risk preferences. Unlike
HHRS, who find a concave relationship between smoking intensity and discounting
behaviour, estimates of the quadratic term across all parameters in our model are not
statistically significant so we only include a linear term for smoking intensity.
Table 4 shows that for both men and women there is a large and statistically
significant relationship between the number of cigarettes smoked per day and the long-term
discounting parameter δ. Specifically, every additional cigarette smoked per day is associated
with a 5 percentage point increase in the long-term discounting of men, whereas every
additional cigarette smoked per day is associated with a 3 percentage point increase in the
long-term discounting of women.30 These economically significant estimates explain why
heavier smokers find it harder to quit: the long-term benefits that result from successful
abstention are discounted heavily and do not exceed the short-term costs of quitting. By
contrast, there is no statistically significant relationship between smoking intensity and the
present-bias parameter β.

Thun et al. [2013] review historical differences in male and female smoking prevalence and smoking
behaviour in the United States since the early 20th century. They also examine male and female death rates and
relative risks attributed to cigarette smoking during three time periods: 1959-1965, 1982-1988, and 2000-2010.
They find marked disparities in relative risks between male and female smokers in the earlier cohorts, but
convergence in relative risks in the most recent cohort, leading them to quote former US Secretary of Health,
Education, and Welfare, Joseph A. Califano, Jr. [1979, i], who wrote, “Women who smoke like men die like
men who smoke.”
30 Table E2 in the appendix shows that these results are robust to the assumptions of EUT and exponential
discounting.
29
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Table 4 also suggests that there is a relationship between smoking intensity and the
atemporal risk attitudes of men and women. For women, the number of cigarettes smoked per
day is statistically significant in the PWF parameter φ. For men, the number of cigarettes
smoked per day is statistically significant in the atemporal risk preference parameter r and the
PWF parameter φ. However, the statistically significant estimate for r is 0.005 (p < 0.05), and
is not economically significant: a 10 cigarette increase in the smoking intensity of men is
only associated with a 0.05 increase in the atemporal risk preference parameter r, implying
only a modest decrease in atemporal risk aversion. Furthermore, this statistically significant
result is likely a product of our joint estimation statistical framework, because Table D2 in
the appendix shows that when analysing the atemporal risk preference data alone, there is no
relationship between smoking intensity and curvature of the atemporal utility function of
men. Similarly, the statistically significant estimate of the number of cigarettes smoked per
day by women in the PWF parameter φ is also not present in the atemporal risk preference
data alone.
Table 4
Intertemporal Risk Preference ML Estimates
RDU, Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting
Smoking Intensity: Number of Cigarettes Smoked per Day

Atemporal risk preference parameter (r)
Age
White
Financial situation
Staff member
Number of cigarettes
Constant
PWF parameter (φ)
Age
White
Financial situation
Staff member
Number of cigarettes
Constant
PWF parameter (η)
Age
White
Financial situation
Staff member
Number of cigarettes
Constant
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Model 1
Male
Estimate Std error

Model 2
Female
Estimate Std error

-0.001
-0.025
-0.002
0.027
0.005**
0.589***

0.002
0.031
0.012
0.043
0.002
0.065

-0.002
0.022
0.024
0.011
0.003
0.442***

0.001
0.027
0.015
0.034
0.003
0.053

0.004
0.175**
-0.024
0.030
-0.015***
0.733***

0.005
0.076
0.032
0.111
0.005
0.130

-0.001
0.039
0.022
-0.013
0.012***
0.617***

0.003
0.066
0.028
0.090
0.004
0.107

0.016*
-0.029
-0.008
-0.184
0.004
0.648***

0.009
0.086
0.047
0.152
0.008
0.245

-0.001
0.024
0.108***
-0.130
0.009
0.811***

0.005
0.098
0.041
0.111
0.008
0.151

Table 4 (Continued)

Discounting parameter (β)
Age
White
Financial situation
Staff member
Number of cigarettes
Constant
Discounting parameter (δ)
Age
White
Financial situation
Staff member
Number of cigarettes
Constant
Intertemporal risk preference parameter (ρ)
Age
White
Financial situation
Staff member
Number of cigarettes
Constant
Error terms
μ
υ
ψ
N
log-likelihood

Model 1
Male
Estimate
Std error

Model 2
Female
Estimate
Std error

0.000
0.009
0.001
0.003
-0.001
0.966***

0.001
0.011
0.005
0.009
0.001
0.018

0.000
0.016**
0.003
0.000
0.000
0.964***

0.000
0.007
0.004
0.008
0.000
0.016

0.005
-0.399**
-0.274***
-0.226
0.052**
1.755***

0.009
0.173
0.091
0.258
0.023
0.353

-0.002
-0.182
-0.185*
-0.125
0.034**
1.404***

0.005
0.121
0.097
0.166
0.014
0.368

-0.050
-0.096
-0.153
0.972
-0.047**
1.664*

0.034
0.351
0.194
0.664
0.024
0.945

0.025
-3.995
-1.038*
1.353
0.059
-0.128

0.048
8.671
0.534
1.290
0.075
1.238

0.127***
0.989***
0.208***
20900
11635.506

0.007
0.276
0.024

0.149***
0.559***
0.314***
26410
15082.686

0.008
0.140
0.028

Results account for clustering at the individual level
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
By contrast, the statistically significant estimate of the number of cigarettes smoked
per day by men in the PWF parameter φ is present in the atemporal risk preference data
alone; see Table D2. But this estimate of -0.015 is not economically significant: a 10 cigarette
increase in the smoking intensity of men leads to a 0.15 decrease in the PWF parameter φ,
implying only a small change in probability weighting. Thus, while there is a robust
statistical relationship between the number of cigarettes smoked per day and the probability
weighting of men this does not lead to substantive economic changes in atemporal risk
attitudes.
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Finally, Table 4 shows that smoking intensity is related to the intertemporal risk
attitudes of men (p < 0.05) but not women (p = 0.434). For men, every additional cigarette
smoked per day is associated with a 0.05 increase in intertemporal risk aversion, implying
that heavier male smokers in our sample tend to be more intertemporally risk averse. This
estimate is economically significant because an increase of 10 cigarettes smoked per day is
associated with a 0.5 increase in intertemporal risk aversion. The point estimate for women of
the number of cigarettes smoked per day is of the opposite sign and has a large standard
error.31 This shows the importance of splitting the sample by gender when analysing
intertemporal risk attitudes, because the statistically significant estimate for men is washed
out by the large standard error of the estimate for women when the sample is pooled; see
Table D3 in the appendix for the pooled estimates.
Table D4 in the appendix presents results from the SDU model where the parameters
are allowed to vary as a linear function of demographics, socio-economic characteristics, and
smoking severity, measured by smokers’ scores on the FTCD. For men and women, there are
no statistically significant relationships between present-bias β, long-term discounting δ, and
smoking severity. Similarly, there are no substantive relationships between smoking severity
and the atemporal risk preferences of men and women.32 However, there is a large and
statistically significant (p < 0.05) relationship between smoking severity and the
intertemporal risk attitudes of men. A 1-unit increase in FTCD score is associated with a 0.44
increase in intertemporal risk aversion, suggesting that as smoking severity increases, male
smokers become much more intertemporally risk averse. Echoing the results for smoking
intensity, there is no statistically significant relationship between smoking severity and the
intertemporal risk preferences of women.33

Table E2 in the appendix shows that these intertemporal risk preference results are robust to the assumptions
of EUT and exponential discounting.
32 Table D5 in the appendix shows the results for men and women from the RDU model estimated on the
atemporal risk preference data alone. There are no statistically significant relationships between smoking
severity and the atemporal risk preferences of women. For men, the FTCD score is statistically significant in the
power function parameter r and the PWF parameter φ but only at the 10% level in both cases, and the
coefficient estimates are not economically significant.
33 Table E3 shows that these results are robust to the assumptions of EUT and exponential discounting.
31
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6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
We investigate the relationship between atemporal risk preferences, time preferences,
intertemporal risk preferences, and three measures of smoking behaviour using an incentivecompatible experimental design and structural econometric framework. We find statistically
and economically significant evidence of non-linear probability weighting in choice under
atemporal risk but no substantive differences in atemporal risk preferences by smoking status,
smoking intensity, and smoking severity.
By contrast, time preferences are related both to smoking status and smoking
intensity. Smokers discount significantly more heavily than non-smokers, and ex-smokers
discount at a level between these two groups. In addition, there is a large and statistically
significant relationship between smoking intensity and the discounting behaviour of men and
women: every additional cigarette is associated with a 3-5 percentage point increase in the
long-term discounting parameter δ. However, smoking severity is not related to long-term
discounting, and there are no statistically significant differences in present-bias according to
smoking status, smoking intensity, and smoking severity.
The intertemporal risk preferences of our sample are characterised by a large degree
of heterogeneity and high levels of intertemporal risk aversion that varies according to gender
and financial situation but not by smoking status. Analyses conducted on subsamples of men
and women reveal that smoking intensity and smoking severity are associated with the
intertemporal risk attitudes of men but not the intertemporal risk attitudes of woman. These
results are robust to different models of choice under atemporal risk and alternative
discounting specifications.
Our research makes a number of contributions to the experimental economic literature
on addiction. First, we replicate the finding of HHRS, using a larger sample with more
demographic and socio-economic variation, that atemporal risk aversion does not differ
substantively according to smoking status and smoking intensity, while extending this null
result to smoking severity as measured by the FTCD. These results suggest that despite the
clear risks involved in tobacco smoking, atemporal risk preferences are not a robust
behavioural marker of addiction.
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Second, we replicate the finding of economically and statistically significant
differences in the time preferences of smokers and non-smokers, and add nuance to this result
by including ex-smokers in the sample: ex-smokers discount at a level between smokers and
non-smokers. This suggests a causal relationship between discounting behaviour and
smoking status, about which we can only speculate. One hypothesis is that this mid-range
discounting of ex-smokers explains why they were inclined to start smoking initially but then
able to quit successfully. However, this hypothesis does not square with the fact that almost
all smokers eventually quit successfully following multiple attempts, implying that there
should be heavy discounters who are ex-smokers, unless causation runs in the other direction.
Another hypothesis is that in a sample that is random with respect to age, or skewed younger
(as our sample is), ex-smokers who quit younger should be more frequently observed than
ex-smokers who quit older. This would then suggest that the mid-range discount rates of exsmokers would be negatively correlated, for causal reasons, with the number of unsuccessful
quit attempts. Our data do not allow us to adjudicate between these alternative hypotheses.
Third, we identify a large, positive relationship between smoking intensity and the
discounting behaviour of men and women that has important implications for treatment of
tobacco use disorder. Heavier smokers tend to have higher discount rates, which will make it
harder for them to quit because the long-term costs of continuing to smoke and the long-term
benefits that result from successful abstention are discounted heavily. These differences in
smoking intensity and discounting behaviour could be leveraged in the design of smoking
cessation programmes. For example, the reinforcement schedules of a contingency
management smoking cessation intervention, which provides monetary incentives for
biochemically-verified abstinence, could be tailored to the smoking intensity and discounting
behaviour of smokers. Heavier smokers could be assigned to a front-loaded reinforcement
schedule where they are given a large first payment for successful abstention to get them over
the initial hump. Lighter smokers, on the other hand, could be given a uniform-incentive
reinforcement schedule where the rewards for abstinence are held constant across visits.
Acknowledging differences between smokers and adjusting cessation interventions
accordingly may make treatment of tobacco use disorder more efficacious in general, and
particularly fruitful in the case of hard-to-treat smokers.
Fourth, this is the first study to have investigated the intertemporal risk preferences of
smokers, specifically, and addicts, generally. Building on the work of Andersen, Harrison,
Lau and Rutström [2018], we provide a template for conducting this investigation that uses

-31-

incentive-compatible economic experiments and a structural econometric framework to
estimate a SDU model jointly with atemporal risk preference specifications and discounting
functions.
Fifth, we show the importance of accurate identification of atemporal risk preferences
and discounting behaviour when drawing inferences about intertemporal risk attitudes. As
errors and uncertainty at all levels of a joint estimation framework propagate, as they should
theoretically, it is theoretically appropriate and empirically necessary to apportion atemporal
risk preferences into their utility function curvature and probability weighting components,
and incorporate non-constant discounting behaviour, if it is present, when estimating SDU
models.
Finally, we identify significant heterogeneity in intertemporal risk preferences but
find, contrary to the assumption employed by some economic models of addiction, that
smokers do not exhibit intertemporal risk seeking behaviour. Our sample is characterised by
a high level of intertemporal risk aversion, which does not differ significantly according to
smoking status. However, measures of smoking intensity and smoking severity are related to
the intertemporal risk attitudes of men: as smoking intensity and smoking severity increase,
this is associated with statistically and economically significant increases in intertemporal
risk aversion. By contrast, the intertemporal risk preferences of women do not differ as a
function of smoking intensity or smoking severity.
As discussed earlier, initial economic models of addiction, in taking it to be a form of
habitual consumption, implicitly conjectured that such intertemporal risk seeking preferences
would be fundamental to choice-based accounts. As demonstrated by Bommier and Rochet
[2006] and Lichtendal, Chao, and Bodily [2012], however, there is no strict implication of
intertemporal risk seeking preferences from modelling addiction as habitual consumption.
However, a theorist might venture the following hypothesis. Stereotyped behavioural
sequences are cues for addictive cravings (see West and Brown [2013]). Such sequences are
habits, though not habits of consumption. Perhaps, then, people with stronger dispositions to
adopt habits in general should be more vulnerable to pathological development of the form of
neural associative learning that underlies addiction. This reasoning would generate the
opposite prediction from the BM model of addiction: we would expect to find statistically
higher intertemporal risk aversion in addicts. Our findings relating smoking severity and the
consumption of cigarettes to the intertemporal risk preferences of men, support this idea. But
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the lack of these relationships amongst women, at least in our sample, point to the need for
more research into the aetiology of smoking in women (and men).
Our experimental methodology points the way to further research. Clinical
observation records that some addicts consume their addictive targets at steady and stable
rates, while others alternate binges with dry periods (see Ainslie [1992]). The former pattern
is suggestive of higher intertemporal risk aversion than the latter pattern. If there are two
types of addicts who could be reliably distinguished by experimental measurements of
intertemporal risk aversion, as our results for men suggest, this could be useful for clinicians
choosing from menus of therapeutic interventions for patients with varying characteristics. In
general, experimental operationalisation of structural models of heterogeneous behavioural
response within populations is an increasingly emphasised aim and achievement of laboratory
economics.
Taken together, these results have two implications for the behavioural analysis of
smoking. First, heterogeneity of smoking behaviour, rather than the binary classifications of
“ever” or “never” smokers, clearly interacts with risk and time preferences. This is
particularly evident in the smoking intensity results where increases in the number of
cigarettes smoked per day are associated with large increases in long-term discounting
behaviour on the one hand, and increases in the intertemporal risk aversion of men, but not
women, on the other. Second, evidence for atemporal and intertemporal risk aversion,
coupled with moderate levels of discounting, point to the potential role that poorly calibrated
subjective beliefs about smoking might play in the onset and persistence of addiction.
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APPENDIX A
[ONLINE WORKING PAPER]
The introductory presentation, atemporal risk preference task instructions, time
preference task instructions, and intertemporal risk preference task instructions are included
in this appendix. The introductory presentation provides an overview of the session and
includes a detailed discussion of the physical randomisation devices used in the experiment.
The atemporal risk preference task instructions, time preference task instructions, and
intertemporal risk preference task instructions discuss the computer environment within
which choices are made, the options between which the subjects must choose and how to
interpret them, and the payment scheme that is used to determine earnings. The presentation
and instructions were designed to promote comprehension and ensure that subjects
understood how their choices ultimately led to the earnings they received so as to incentivise
the truthful revelation of preferences.
A. Introductory Presentation

Consent Form
• Before we can begin today’s session you need to read and
sign a consent form which you will find in the folder in front
of you
• You will notice that there are 2 consent forms in the folder
and one of them is for you to take home so please place it
in your bag now
• The consent form explains your rights as a research
participant and, by signing it, you give your consent to
participate in the study
• You need to sign the consent form on the last page and
when you have done so please raise your hand
• Once everyone has signed their consent forms, we can
continue
• If you have any questions please raise your hand and
someone will come to answer them
• You may read through the consent form now

Introduction

Welcome

4 Tasks and a Questionnaire

• Thank you for agreeing to take part in this
study, your views and choices will be very
informative and helpful
• Before we get started I would like to explain
how things are going to work
• Once that is done, we can begin with the tasks
• If you have any questions, please do not ask
them out loud – raise your hand and someone
will come over to you

• You will take part in 4 tasks and you will have
the opportunity to earn money in each task
• We will determine your payment for each task
once you have finished that task and write it
down on a payment sheet you will have
beside you
• Once you have completed all 4 tasks, you will
need to fill out a short questionnaire
• We will then total up your payments privately,
as discussed in a moment
• Once this is done, you will be free to leave
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10-sided dice

Earnings

• At the end of each task we will ask you to roll some dice into a
plastic bowl which you can see below
• Two of the dice that you will roll are 10-sided dice and these are
used to select a number between 1 and 100
• Every number between 1 and 100, and including 1 and 100, is
equally likely to occur
• An example of a dice roll is shown below

• You will be paid R40 just for participating in
today’s session
• At the end of each task, we will determine your
earnings for that task
• Some of this money will be paid to you at the end
of the session today, in private, and the rest of it
will be paid to you in the future
• This is why we need your bank details: to pay you
via electronic transfer at a future date
• To determine your earnings for the tasks, we will
ask you to roll some dice
• Let’s go through a quick explanation of the dice
you will roll

10-sided dice

10-sided dice

• Let’s look at a close-up of the 10-sided dice
• As you can see, one of the 10-sided dice has sides which increase in
multiples of 10: 00, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80 and 90
• The other 10-sided dice has sides which increase in multiples of 1: 0, 1, 2,
3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9
• You will roll the two 10-sided dice together and add the numbers on the
two dice to select a number between 1 and 100
• In the example below, the number that was rolled is 86 (80 + 6)

• To tell the difference between a 6 and a 9 there is a dot at
the base of the number
• This is why the number in the picture below is a 6: there is
a dot at the base of the 6
• 9 looks different because there is a dot at the base of the 9
• The new picture below shows you what a 9 looks like

Note: This slide contained animations

10-sided dice

The Tasks

• To roll a number between 1 and 9 you need to roll 00 and a single
number between 1 and 9
• As you can see in the picture below, the number that was rolled is 5
(00 + 5)
• In the case where you roll 00 and 0, this will be treated as 100
• As you can see in the new picture below, the number that was
rolled is 100 (00 and 0)

• We have now finished the introductory
explanation
• You will find instructions for the first task that
you need to complete in the folder in front of
you
• Please read through this and when you are
finished raise your hand so that an
experimenter can play a video for you which
provides further details on the task
• When this is finished you will begin the first
task

Note: This slide contained animations
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B. Atemporal Risk Preference Task Instructions

Task Instructions
This is a task where you will choose between lotteries with varying prizes and
chances of winning. On each computer screen you will be presented with a pair of
lotteries and you will need to choose one of them. There are 90 pairs of lotteries in
this task. For each pair of lotteries, you should choose the lottery you prefer to play.
You will actually get the chance to play one of the lotteries you choose, and you will
be paid according to the outcome of that lottery, so you should think carefully about
which lottery you prefer.
Here is an example of what the computer display of such a pair of lotteries might
look like.

The outcome of the lotteries will be determined by the draw of a random number
between 1 and 100. Each number between, and including, 1 and 100 is equally likely
to occur. In fact, you will be able to draw the number yourself using two 10-sided
dice.
In the above example, the Left lottery pays R20 with a 55% chance, R160 with a
25% chance and R190 with a 20% chance. So when you roll the two 10-sided dice
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if the number drawn is between 1 and 55 you will be paid R20, if the number is
between 56 and 80 you will be paid R160, and if the number is between 81 and 100
you will be paid R190. The blue colour in the pie chart corresponds to 55% of the
area and illustrates the chances that the number drawn will be between 1 and 55 and
your prize will be R20. The orange area in the pie chart corresponds to 25% of the
area and illustrates the chances that the number drawn will be between 56 and 80
and your prize will be R160. The green area in the pie chart corresponds to 20% of
the area and illustrates the chances that the number drawn will be between 81 and
100 and your prize will be R190.
Now look at the Right lottery in the example. It pays R20 with a 75% chance, and
R250 with a 25% chance. So when you roll the two 10-sided dice if the number
drawn is between 1 and 75 you will be paid R20, and if the number is between 76
and 100 you will be paid R250. The blue colour in the pie chart corresponds to 75%
of the area and illustrates the chances that the number drawn will be between 1 and
75 and your prize will be R20. The green area in the pie chart corresponds to 25%
of the area and illustrates the chances that the number drawn will be between 76 and
100 and your prize will be R250.
Each pair of lotteries is shown on a separate screen on the computer. On each
screen, you should indicate which lottery you prefer to play by clicking on one of
the buttons beneath the lotteries.
You could also get a pair of lotteries in which one of the lotteries will give you the
chance to play “Double or Nothing.” For instance, the Right lottery in the following
screen image pays “Double or Nothing” if the Green area is selected. The right pie
chart indicates that there is a 50% chance that you get R0. So if you roll the two 10sided dice and the number drawn is between 1 and 50 you will be paid R0. However,
if the number is between 51 and 100 you will toss a coin to determine if you get
double the amount listed in green (R210). If the coin comes up Heads you get R420,
otherwise you get nothing. The prizes listed underneath each pie refer to the
amounts before any “Double or Nothing” coin toss.
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For instance, suppose you picked the lottery on the left in the last example. If the
random number drawn was 37, you would win R60; if it was 93, you would get R110.
If you picked the lottery on the right and drew the number 37, you would get R0; if
instead you drew 93, you would have to toss a coin to determine if you get “Double
or Nothing.” If the coin comes up Heads then you get R420. However, if it comes
up Tails you get nothing from your chosen lottery.
After you have worked through all of the 90 pairs of lotteries, raise your hand and
an experimenter will come to you to determine your payment for this task. You will
roll two 10-sided dice until a number between 1 and 90 comes up to determine which
pair of lotteries will be played out. Since there is a chance that any of your 90 choices
could be played out for real, you should approach each pair of lotteries as if it is the
one that you will play out. Finally, you will roll the two ten-sided dice again to
determine the outcome of the lottery you chose, and if necessary you will then toss
a coin to determine if you get “Double or Nothing.”
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It is also possible that you will be given a lottery in which there is a “Double or
Nothing” option no matter what number you roll with the two 10-sided dice. The
screen image below illustrates this possibility. The Right lottery in the example pays
“Double or Nothing” for any number that is drawn with the two 10-sided dice. So
if you select the Right lottery and roll a number between 1 and 50 you will toss a
coin to see whether you get R0 or R120 (double R60). If you roll a number between
51 and 100 you will toss a coin to see whether you get R0 or R420 (double R210).

Therefore, your earnings for this task are determined by four things:
• by which lottery you selected, the Left or the Right, for each of these 90 pairs;
• by which lottery pair is chosen to be played out in the set of 90 such pairs using
the two 10-sided dice;
• by the outcome of that lottery when you roll the two 10-sided dice; and
• by the outcome of a coin toss if the chosen lottery outcome is of the “Double or
Nothing” type.
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Which lotteries you prefer is a matter of personal taste. The people next to you may
be presented with different lotteries, and may have different preferences, so their
responses should not matter to you. Please work silently, and make your choices by
thinking carefully about each lottery.
Payment for this task is in cash, and is in addition to the R40 show-up fee that you
receive just for being here. When you have finished the task, please raise your hand
and an experimenter will come to you to determine your payment for this task.
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C. Time Preference Task Instructions

Task Instructions
In this task you will choose between different amounts of money available at
different times. You will need to make 60 choices in total. For each choice you will
decide between a smaller amount of money which is available sooner and a larger
amount of money which is available later. One of your 60 choices will be selected at
random for payment and you will receive the amount of money you chose at the
appropriate date.
All of these choices will be made on a computer and here is an example of what the
computer display might look like:

For the purpose of explaining this task, assume for the moment that today is 29
September, 2016. At the top of the display is a calendar showing you today’s date in
a circle (29 September 2016). This date is also highlighted in purple and a future date
is highlighted in green (13 October 2016). Below the calendar are two columns: a
purple column with amounts of money available at an earlier date (today) and a green
column with amounts of money available at a later date (in 14 days from today). You
need to make 4 choices on this screen. Each choice appears on a different row.
In the first row, you need to choose between receiving R300 today or R301.73 in 14
days from today. Note that R300 is the smaller of the two amounts but it is available
today. R301.73 is the larger of the two amounts but it is only available after 14 days.
Suppose that you prefer R300 today over R301.73 in 14 days from today. To choose
R300 today just click the button saying “Select” under “R300 today”.
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Suppose instead that you prefer R301.73 in 14 days rather than R300 today. To
choose R301.73 in 14 days just click the button saying “Select” under “R301.73 in
14 days”.
Once you have made your choice on the first row you can move on to the other
rows on the screen. You need to make 4 choices on the screen before you can move
on to the next set of 4 choices on a new screen. Once you have made all of your
choices on the screen you can click the button saying “Confirm” to move on to the
next screen. If you would like to change your choices then click “Cancel”.
You will need to make 60 choices in total across 15 screens. The rand amounts
change on each row of each screen. In addition, the times for delivery of the rand
amounts change across screens. For example, on the screen we just looked at, you
had to choose between an amount of money available today and an amount of
money available in 14 days. On a different screen, you may need to choose between
an amount of money available in 7 days and another amount of money available in
21 days. So please pay careful attention when making your choices.
When you are finished the task, please raise your hand and an experimenter will
come to you to determine your payment for this task. You will select one of the 15
screens from this task by rolling a 20-sided dice. If the dice lands on 1, you will select
screen 1; if the dice lands on 7, you will select screen 7; if the dice lands on 12, you
will select screen 12; and so on. If the dice lands on 16, 17, 18, 19 or 20, you will roll
the dice again until it lands on a number between 1 and 15.
Once you have selected a screen, you will roll a 4-sided dice to select 1 of the 4 rows
on the screen. If the dice lands on 1, you will select row 1; if the dice lands on 2, you
will select row 2; and so on. Once you have selected the row, we will look at the
choice that you made on that row. You will then be paid for the choice that you
made on that row on the date listed for that choice. For instance, in the last example,
suppose that row 3 is selected for payment. If you chose R300 today, you will be
paid R300 at the end of today’s session. If you chose R317.51 in 14 days then you
will be paid R317.51 in 14 days via electronic transfer into your bank account and
you will receive a payment notification on your cellphone when the transaction has
taken place. That is why we need your bank account details: to pay you via electronic
transfer, if necessary.
Note that the option you prefer on each row is a matter of personal taste. The people
next to you may have different tastes so their choices should not matter for you.
Please work silently and make your choices by thinking carefully about each option.
Since there is a chance that any of your 60 choices could be selected for payment,
you should approach each choice as if it is the one that you will be paid for.
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D. Intertemporal Risk Preference Task Instructions

Task Instructions
In this task you will make a number of choices between two options that we can
think of as the TOP and BOTTOM options. An example of a choice that you will
need to make is shown below.

You will need to make 40 choices in total across 40 screens. On each screen, you
should choose the option you prefer.
The outcome of each option will be determined by the draw of a random number
between 1 and 10. Each number is equally likely to occur, and you will draw the
number yourself using a 10-sided dice.
In the example, the TOP option pays R300 in 7 days AND R30 in 21 days if the
number is 1 or 2. It pays R30 in 7 days AND R300 in 21 days if the number is
between 3 and 10.
The BOTTOM option pays R300 in 7 days AND R300 in 21 days if the number is
1 or 2. It pays R30 in 7 days AND R30 in 21 days if the number is between 3 and
10.
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When you are finished the task, please raise your hand and an experimenter will
come to you to determine your payment for this task. You will be paid for one of
your choices in this task. You will select one of the 40 choices you made by rolling
a 4-sided dice and a 10-sided dice. If you roll 1 on the 4-sided dice, you will select
choices 1-10; if you roll 2 on the 4-sided dice, you will select choices 11-20; if you
roll 3 on the 10-sided dice, you will select choices 21-30; and if you roll 4 on the 4sided dice, you will select choices 31-40. You will then roll the 10-sided dice to select
a number between one of these ranges. For example, suppose you roll 3 on the 4sided dice. Then you will select choices 21-30. If you then roll 7 on the 10-sided dice
you will select choice 27. Once the choice has been selected, you will then roll the
10-sided dice again to determine the payment for the decision that you made. Any
future payments will be made via electronic transfer into your bank account and you
will receive a payment notification on your cellphone when the transaction has taken
place. That is why we need your bank account details: to pay you via electronic
transfer.
If the example above is selected for payment and you chose the TOP option, you
will roll the 10-sided dice to determine your earnings for this task. If you roll a 8
then you will be paid R30 in 7 days AND R300 in 21 days.
By contrast, if the example above is selected for payment and you chose the
BOTTOM option, you will roll the 10-sided dice to determine your earnings for this
task. If you roll a 5 then you will be paid R30 in 7 days AND R30 in 21 days.
Note that the option you prefer is a matter of personal taste. The people next to you
may have different tastes so their choices should not matter to you. Please work
silently and make your choices by thinking carefully about each option. Since there
is a chance that any of your 40 choices could be selected for payment, you should
approach each choice as if it is the one you will be paid for.
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APPENDIX B
[ONLINE WORKING PAPER]
Risk Preference Task Lotteries
The 90 lottery pairs used in the risk preference task were drawn from the designs of
Wakker, Erev and Weber (WEW) [1994], Loomes and Sugden (LS) [1998], Cox and Sadiraj
(CS) [ 2008, p. 33], and Harrison, Martínez-Correa and Swarthout (HMS) [2015].
WEW constructed a battery of lotteries to test the “comonotonic independence”
axiom of rank-dependent utility (RDU) theory, due to Quiggin [1982]. Their main lottery
pairs consist of 6 sets of 4 pairs. The logic of their design can be seen by considering the first
set [WEW, p. 204, Figure 3.1]. The second and third prizes in each pair stay the same within
the set of 4 lottery pairs. The only thing that varies from pair to pair is the monetary value of
the first prize, and that is common to the two lotteries within each pair. Since the first prize is
a common consequence in both lotteries within a pair, the independence axiom of expected
utility theory (EUT) implies that it should not affect choices. In the 1st pair the first prize is
only $0.50, and it is the lowest ranked prize for both lotteries. The first prize increases to
$3.50 in the 2nd pair, but it is again the lowest ranked prize for both lotteries. Consequently,
rank-dependence should have no effect on choice patterns as the subject moves from the 1st to
the 2nd pair. By contrast, the first prize in the 3rd pair is $6.50, which makes it the second
highest ranked prize for both lotteries; this is where RDU could generate a different
prediction to EUT, depending on the nature and extent of probability weighting. Finally, in
the 4th pair the common consequence of $9.50 is the highest ranked prize for both lotteries,
again allowing RDU to predict something different to EUT, and to the choices in the 3rd pair.
This design does not formally require a RDU decision-maker to choose differently to an EUT
decision-maker, but simply allows it for a priori reasonable levels of probability weighting.
We used all 24 of the main WEW lottery pairs and scaled the prizes considerably.
LS designed lottery pairs to accommodate a wide range of risk preferences, to provide
good coverage of the probability space, and to generate common ratio tests of EUT. We used
30 lottery pairs from the LS design which provided a thorough and well-balanced coverage of
the Marschak-Machina (MM) triangle and captured the full range of risk preferences, under
the null hypothesis of EUT: risk-loving - gradients less than 1; risk neutral - gradients equal
to 1; and risk averse - gradients greater than 1.
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CS designed a simple test of the calibration puzzle posed by Hansson [1988] and
Rabin [2000]: that the risk aversion which is observed with small stakes in the lab yields
implausible levels of risk aversion with larger stakes. The logic of the CS design is as
follows: give people choices between safe and risky lotteries, where the safe lotteries are
certain amounts of money, and the risky lotteries are a 50:50 chance of -y/+x either side of
the certain amount of money in the safe lottery. For each lottery pair, x > y so that the
expected value of the risky lottery is slightly larger than the value of the safe lottery. Across a
set of lottery pairs, the value of the safe prize varies, but x and y are held constant. The idea
behind this test of the calibration puzzle is to regard the safe lottery as “lab wealth,” and then
see if subjects are risk averse as one varies lab wealth. For example, suppose -y/+x = $10/+$15, then consider two binary choices: one where the safe lottery is $20 and another
where the safe lottery is $100. The subject then makes two choices: take $20 for certain, or
take a 50:50 chance of $10 or $35; and take $100 for certain, or take a 50:50 chance of $90 or
$115. The Hansson-Rabin premiss is that one gets risk aversion in both cases, with a majority
of people picking the safe lottery. We used 6 lottery pairs from the implementation of the CS
design in Harrison, Lau, Ross and Swarthout [2017]: 3 pairs where -y/+x = -R60/+R70 and
the safe options were R120, R320, and R520; and 3 pairs where -y/+x = -R30/+R40 and the
safe options were R60, R340, and R540.
HMS designed lotteries to test the reduction of compound lotteries (ROCL) axiom,
which states that a decision-maker is indifferent between a multi-stage compound lottery and
the actuarially-equivalent simple lottery where the probabilities of the stages of the
compound lottery have been multiplied out. Given a simple (S) lottery and compound (C)
lottery, HMS create an actuarially-equivalent (AE) lottery from a two-stage C lottery by
multiplying out the probabilities of the two-stages, and then construct three pairs of lotteries:
a S-C pair, a S-AE pair, and an AE-C pair. They used probabilities drawn from {0, ¼, ½, ¾,
1} and final prizes of {$0, $10, $20, $35, $70}. The compound lotteries were created using a
“double or nothing” (DON) procedure so the first-stage prizes in a compound lottery were
drawn from {$5, $10, $17.5, $35}. The second-stage DON procedure then provides the set of
final prizes above, which is either $0 or double the stakes of the first stage.
Most of the HMS compound lotteries used a conditional version of DON, where the
initial lottery triggered the DON procedure only if a particular outcome was realised in the
initial lottery. For example, consider the compound lottery formed by an initial lottery that
pays $10 and $20 with equal probability. The DON stage is reached if the outcome of the
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initial lottery is $10. Then, in the subsequent DON lottery, the subject has an equal chance of
winning $20 (i.e., double $10) or $0 (i.e., nothing). Alternatively, if the realised outcome of
the initial lottery is $20, the DON stage is not triggered, and the subject earns $20. Figure 2 in
HMS [p. 35] shows a tree representation of this compound lottery and the corresponding
actuarially-equivalent simple lottery. The benefit of using a conditional DON lottery is that it
allows one to obtain better coverage of the MM triangle relative to unconditional DON (see
p. 35-36 of HMS for more details). This allows for variation in both prizes and probability
distributions so that one can identify source-dependent preferences that take into account
attitudes toward variability in prizes and variability in probabilities. We used 30 lottery pairs
from the HMS design: 15 S-C pairs and 15 S-AE pairs. Hence we have a data-based metric,
between 0 and 15, for each subject’s consistency with the ROCL axiom.
ADDITIONAL REFERENCES
HARRISON, G. W., M. I. LAU, D. ROSS, AND J. T. SWARTHOUT (2017): “Small Stakes Risk
Aversion in the Laboratory: A Reconsideration,” Economics Letters, 160, 24-28.
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APPENDIX C
In this appendix we estimate the SDU model (9) in the main text under the
assumptions that EUT characterises choice under atemporal risk and that discounting is
exponential. We then analyse the atemporal risk preference data and the time preference data
to determine whether RDU, as opposed to EUT, better characterises choice under atemporal
risk and whether there is statistically significant evidence of quasi-hyperbolic discounting.
We find statistically significant evidence of nonlinear probability weighting which has an
economically significant impact on estimates of the power utility function parameter r and
the exponential discount rate. In addition, we find evidence of quasi-hyperbolic discounting
which has an economically significant effect on estimates of the long-term discounting
parameter δ.
Table C1
Intertemporal Risk Preference ML Estimates
EUT, Exponential Discounting
Homogenous Preferences
Model
Estimate
Atemporal Risk Preferences
Power function parameter (r)
0.409***
(0.019)
Error (μ)
0.167***
(0.007)
Time Preferences
Discounting parameter (δ)
0.782***
(0.062)
Error (υ)
0.360***
(0.062)
Intertemporal Risk Preferences
Power function parameter (ρ)
-1.043***
(0.290)
Error (ψ)
0.312***
(0.021)
N
48640
log-likelihood
-28973.300
Results account for clustering at the individual level
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table C1 presents estimates of the SDU model (9) under the assumptions that EUT
characterises choice under atemporal risk and that discounting is exponential. As discussed in
the main text, the estimate of the intertemporal risk preference parameter ρ = -1.043 implies a
high level of intertemporal risk aversion.
Table C2 presents estimates of an RDU model with a power utility function and the
Prelec PWF. The estimate of φ = 0.629 is significantly less than 1 (p < 0.001) which gives the
PWF an inverse-S shape form. The estimate of r under the RDU model is statistically
significantly higher than the estimate of r under the EUT model (p < 0.001), implying that it
is necessary to estimate time preference models jointly with a RDU model of atemporal risk
preferences.
Table C2
Atemporal Risk Preference ML Estimates
Homogenous Preferences
Model 1
EUT
0.408***
(0.019)

Power function parameter (r)
PWF parameter (φ)
PWF parameter (η)
Error (μ)

0.167***
(0.007)
23040
-15030,136

N
log-likelihood

Model 2
RDU
0.553***
(0.023)
0.629***
(0.020)
1.020***
(0.031)
0.145***
(0.005)
23040
-14696,023

Results account for clustering at the individual level
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
While the sample as a whole is better characterised by RDU than by EUT, this does
not imply that every person in the sample probability weights and, therefore, departs from
EUT. Figure C1 shows the results from an individual-level analysis where we estimate EUT
and RDU specifications for each subject and then test whether ω(p) = p in the RDU model.
Using a 5% level of statistical significance, we cannot reject the hypothesis that ω(p) = p for
57% of the sample, implying that at least half of the people in our study are better
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characterised by EUT than RDU. However, the remaining 43% of the sample exhibits
statistically significant evidence of nonlinear probability weighting. Hence it is necessary to
take this probability weighting into account when drawing inferences about time preferences
and intertemporal risk preferences at the level of the sample of subjects.

Distribution of p-values of Test of EUT
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Figure C1: Classifying Subjects as EUT or RDU
Table C3 presents estimates of two exponential discounting models. Model 1 assumes
that EUT and a power utility function characterise choice under atemporal risk whereas
Model 2 assumes RDU with a power utility function and the Prelec PWF. The estimate of the
long-term discounting parameter δ is statistically significantly higher under the RDU model
relative to the EUT model (p < 0.001), which highlights the way in which atemporal risk
preference estimates propagate into estimates of discounting parameters.
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Table C3
Exponential Discounting Function ML Estimates
EUT and RDU, Homogenous Preferences
Model 1
EUT
0.410***
(0.019)

Model 2
RDU
Power function parameter (r)
0.553***
(0.022)
PWF parameter (φ)
0.629***
(0.020)
PWF parameter (η)
1.021***
(0.031)
Discounting parameter (δ)
0.785***
1.192***
(0.063)
(0.101)
Risk error (μ)
0.167***
0.145***
(0.007)
(0.005)
Time error (ν)
0.362***
1.106***
(0.062)
(0.199)
N
38400
38400
log-likelihood
-23681,626 -23345,72
Results account for clustering at the individual level
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table C4 shows the statistically and economically significant influence of quasihyperbolic discounting on estimates of the long-term discounting parameter δ. Under the
quasi-hyperbolic model, there is a sharp drop in the value of a reward if it is not available
immediately but this drop asymptotes toward the long-term discounting parameter δ over
time. In the exponential model, by contrast, the discount rate δ does not vary over time and
remains at the far higher level of 1.192.
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Table C4
Discounting Function ML Estimates
Rank-Dependent Utility, Homogenous Preferences
Model 1
Model 3
Exponential Quasi-Hyperbolic
Power function parameter (r)
0.553***
0.541***
(0.022)
(0.021)
PWF parameter (φ)
0.629***
0.632***
(0.020)
(0.020)
PWF parameter (η)
1.021***
1.012***
(0.031)
(0.030)
Discounting parameter (δ)
1.192***
0.885***
(0.101)
(0.073)
Discounting parameter (β)
0.960***
(0.003)
Risk error (μ)
0.145***
0.145***
(0.005)
(0.005)
Time error (ν)
1.106***
1.013***
(0.199)
(0.176)
N
38400
38400
log-likelihood
-23345,72
-22939,946
Results account for clustering at the individual level
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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APPENDIX D
[ONLINE WORKING PAPER]
In this appendix we present results from the SDU model estimated jointly with a RDU
model, power utility function, and Prelec PWF for choice under atemporal risk, and a quasihyperbolic discounting function. We allow the parameters of the SDU model to vary as a
linear function of demographics, socio-economic characteristics, and three measures of
smoking behaviour: smoking status (Table D1); smoking intensity, measured by the number
of cigarettes smoked per day (Table D3); and smoking severity, measured by smokers’ scores
on the FTCD (Table D4). These latter two tables are split according to gender given the
historical differences in smoking prevalence between men and women, and the economically
and statistically significant differences in their intertemporal risk preferences. We also
present atemporal risk preference results in Table D2 to corroborate the discussion in the
main text that there are no substantive differences in the atemporal risk preferences of men
and women as a function of smoking intensity.
Table D1
Intertemporal Risk Preference ML Estimates
RDU, Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting
Heterogenous Preferences
Model
Estimate Std error
Atemporal risk preference parameter (r)
Age
White
Male
Financial situation
Staff member
Ex-smoker
Smoker
Constant
PWF parameter (φ)
Age
White
Male
Financial situation
Staff member
Ex-smoker
Smoker
Constant
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-0.002
0.010
0.008
0.010
0.020
0.003
0.028
0.526***

0.001
0.020
0.016
0.009
0.026
0.032
0.019
0.041

0.000
0.087*
0.137***
0.009
0.036
0.026
0.013
0.596***

0.003
0.051
0.044
0.020
0.075
0.072
0.043
0.088

Table D1 (Continued)
Model
Estimate
Std error
PWF parameter (η)
Age
White
Male
Financial situation
Staff member
Ex-smoker
Smoker
Constant
Discounting parameter (β)
Age
White
Male
Financial situation
Staff member
Ex-smoker
Smoker
Constant
Discounting parameter (δ)
Age
White
Male
Financial situation
Staff member
Ex-smoker
Smoker
Constant
Intertemporal risk preference parameter (ρ)
Age
White
Male
Financial situation
Staff member
Ex-smoker
Smoker
Constant
Error terms
μ
υ
ψ
N
log-likelihood

0.003
-0.018
-0.080
0.069**
-0.118
0.172
0.039
0.823***

0.004
0.066
0.058
0.032
0.092
0.107
0.061
0.124

0.000
0.014**
-0.002
0.001
0.003
-0.005
-0.007
0.970***

0.000
0.006
0.005
0.003
0.006
0.009
0.005
0.012

0.000
-0.254**
0.020
-0.211***
-0.186
0.111
0.356***
1.521***

0.005
0.100
0.096
0.061
0.134
0.143
0.130
0.230

0.000
-0.569
0.841**
-0.611**
1.064
-1.958*
-0.288
0.537

0.027
0.500
0.382
0.261
0.688
1.180
0.411
0.832

0.140***
0.761***
0.275***
47310
-26859.893

0.005
0.135
0.023

Results account for clustering at the individual level
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table D2
Atemporal Risk Preference ML Estimates
Rank-Dependent Utility Theory
Smoking Intensity: Number of Cigarettes Smoked per Day

Power function parameter (r)
Age
White
Financial situation
Staff member
Number of cigarettes
Constant
PWF parameter (φ)
Age
White
Financial situation
Staff member
Number of cigarettes
Constant
PWF parameter (η)
Age
White
Financial situation
Staff member
Number of cigarettes
Constant
Error (μ)
Constant
N
log-likelihood

Model 1
Male
Estimate
Std Error

Model 2
Female
Estimate
Std Error

-0.003
-0.070
0.036
0.104
-0.003
0.605***

0.005
0.075
0.041
0.123
0.007
0.138

-0.010***
-0.009
0.020
0.211*
0.010
0.653***

0.004
0.069
0.030
0.122
0.007
0.115

0.008*
0.099
-0.040
-0.021
-0.014***
0.623***

0.004
0.069
0.029
0.096
0.005
0.105

0.003
0.061
0.014
-0.035
0.005
0.442***

0.003
0.060
0.026
0.083
0.004
0.112

0.016*
-0.095
0.013
-0.145
-0.002
0.608**

0.010
0.079
0.050
0.156
0.006
0.256

-0.008
0.029
0.109**
0.065
0.008
0.964***

0.007
0.141
0.048
0.140
0.012
0.167

0.128***
9900
-6269.601

0.007

0.157***
12510
-7901.332

0.009

Results account for clustering at the individual level
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table D3
Intertemporal Risk Preference ML Estimates
RDU, Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting
Smoking Intensity: Number of Cigarettes Smoked per Day
Model
Estimate
Std error
Atemporal risk preference parameter (r)
Age
White
Male
Financial situation
Staff member
Number of cigarettes
Constant
PWF parameter (φ)
Age
White
Male
Financial situation
Staff member
Number of cigarettes
Constant
PWF parameter (η)
Age
White
Male
Financial situation
Staff member
Number of cigarettes
Constant
Discounting parameter (β)
Age
White
Male
Financial situation
Staff member
Number of cigarettes
Constant
Discounting parameter (δ)
Age
White
Male
Financial situation
Staff member
Number of cigarettes
Constant
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-0.002
0.005
0.007
0.012
0.018
0.004**
0.522***

0.001
0.019
0.016
0.008
0.025
0.002
0.040

0.000
0.094*
0.137***
0.006
0.021
-0.003
0.611***

0.003
0.050
0.044
0.020
0.073
0.004
0.086

0.003
-0.004
-0.086
0.066**
-0.119
0.004
0.830***

0.005
0.067
0.059
0.033
0.093
0.005
0.126

-0.000
0.014**
-0.002
0.002
0.003
-0.000
0.967***

0.000
0.006
0.004
0.003
0.006
0.000
0.011

-0.001
-0.271***
0.027
-0.205***
-0.168
0.040***
1.535***

0.005
0.101
0.097
0.059
0.135
0.012
0.221

Table D3 (Continued)
Model
Estimate
Std error
Intertemporal risk preference parameter (ρ)
Age
White
Male
Financial situation
Staff member
Number of cigarettes
Constant
Error terms
μ
υ
ψ
N
log-likelihood

-0.004
-0.740
0.914**
-0.572**
1.013
-0.013
0.326

0.029
0.550
0.403
0.273
0.678
0.041
0.782

0.141***
0.751***
0.280***
47310
-26883.870

0.005
0.128
0.024

Results account for clustering at the individual level
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table D4
Intertemporal Risk Preference ML Estimates
RDU, Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting
Smoking Severity: Fagerström Test for Cigarette Dependence

Atemporal risk preference parameter (r)
Age
White
Financial situation
Staff member
FTCD score
Constant
PWF parameter (φ)
Age
White
Financial situation
Staff member
FTCD score
Constant
PWF parameter (η)
Age
White
Financial situation
Staff member
FTCD score
Constant
Discounting parameter (β)
Age
White
Financial situation
Staff member
FTCD score
Constant
Discounting parameter (δ)
Age
White
Financial situation
Staff member
FTCD score
Constant
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Model 1
Male
Estimate Std error

Model 2
Female
Estimate Std error

0.002
-0.030
-0.013
0.018
0.005
0.521***

0.004
0.039
0.016
0.051
0.007
0.106

-0.003**
0.068
-0.006
0.054
0.000
0.570***

0.002
0.059
0.014
0.042
0.008
0.076

0.014
0.198
-0.134**
-0.153
-0.049**
0.871***

0.015
0.147
0.057
0.191
0.022
0.298

-0.003
0.057
0.025
-0.032
-0.007
0.806***

0.005
0.083
0.043
0.116
0.014
0.145

-0.017
-0.143
0.118*
-0.087
0.064**
0.918

0.028
0.133
0.069
0.222
0.027
0.574

0.001
-0.077
0.135**
-0.096
0.003
0.742***

0.010
0.192
0.062
0.197
0.039
0.258

0.000
0.006
-0.004
-0.001
0.000
0.970***

0.001
0.012
0.007
0.014
0.002
0.018

0.000
0.013
-0.004
0.000
0.001
0.979***

0.000
0.011
0.004
0.015
0.001
0.014

0.035
-0.334
-0.192
-0.109
0.078
0.832

0.039
0.283
0.167
0.449
0.065
0.949

-0.002
0.130
-0.098
-0.515*
-0.006
1.535***

0.011
0.374
0.144
0.289
0.044
0.456

Table D4 (Continued)
Model 1
Male
Estimate
Std error
Intertemporal risk preference parameter (ρ)
Age
White
Financial situation
Staff member
FTCD score
Constant
Error terms
μ
υ
ψ
N
log-likelihood

Model 2
Female
Estimate
Std error

0.008
0.259
-0.994**
0.809
-0.435**
3.040**

0.077
0.930
0.497
0.907
0.213
1.493

0.022
1.232
-0.656
0.463
0.409
-1.177

0.083
1.538
0.555
1.876
0.403
2.876

0.131***
0.606**
0.224***
9120
-4797.759

0.011
0.252
0.047

0.146***
0.439**
0.221***
8170
-4401.497

0.014
0.178
0.063

Results account for clustering at the individual level
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table D5
Atemporal Risk Preference ML Estimates
Rank-Dependent Utility Theory
Smoking Severity: Fagerström Test for Cigarette Dependence

Power function parameter (r)
Age
White
Financial situation
Staff member
FTCD score
Constant
PWF parameter (φ)
Age
White
Financial situation
Staff member
FTCD score
Constant
PWF parameter (η)
Age
White
Financial situation
Staff member
FTCD score
Constant
Error (μ)
Constant
N
log-likelihood

Model 1
Male
Estimate
Std Error

Model 2
Female
Estimate
Std Error

0.046
0.069
-0.067
-0.237
-0.069*
-0.056

0.092
0.196
0.099
0.580
0.040
1.743

-0.017
0.130
-0.024
0.456
0.033
0.824**

0.014
0.120
0.052
0.468
0.030
0.348

0.028
0.127
-0.098*
-0.267
-0.038*
0.343

0.035
0.122
0.052
0.223
0.021
0.760

0.010*
0.115
0.019
-0.202
-0.016
0.390**

0.005
0.087
0.044
0.153
0.017
0.174

0.050
-0.031
0.063
-0.475
0.003
-0.262

0.208
0.256
0.108
1.229
0.028
4.244

-0.001
0.053
0.116*
0.107
0.032
0.678*

0.014
0.191
0.062
0.306
0.057
0.369

0.132***
4320
-2687.46

0.020

0.149***
3870
-2440.704

0.013

Results account for clustering at the individual level
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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APPENDIX E
[ONLINE WORKING PAPER]
The tables in this appendix complement those presented in Appendix D because we
estimate the SDU model jointly with an EUT model and an exponential discounting function.
We allow the parameters of the SDU model to vary as a linear function of demographics,
socio-economic characteristics, and three measures of smoking behaviour: smoking status
(Table E1); smoking intensity, measured by the number of cigarettes smoked per day (Table
E2); and smoking severity, measured by smokers’ scores on the FTCD (Table E3). These
latter two tables are split according to gender given the historical differences in smoking
prevalence between men and women, and the economically and statistically significant
differences in their intertemporal risk preferences.
Table E1
Intertemporal Risk Preference ML Estimates
EUT, Exponential Discounting
Heterogenous Preferences
Model
Estimate
Std error
Atemporal risk preference parameter (r)
Age
White
Male
Financial situation
Staff member
Ex-smoker
Smoker
Constant
Discounting parameter (δ)
Age
White
Male
Financial situation
Staff member
Ex-smoker
Smoker
Constant
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-0.002
0.010
0.019
0.002
0.024
-0.005
0.033*
0.429***

0.001
0.018
0.015
0.008
0.025
0.029
0.018
0.039

0.000
-0.250***
0.033
-0.160***
-0.140
0.097
0.318***
1.268***

0.004
0.090
0.083
0.050
0.118
0.130
0.107
0.197

Table E1 (Continued)
Model

Intertemporal risk preference parameter (ρ)
Age
White
Male
Financial situation
Staff member
Ex-smoker
Smoker
Constant
Error terms
μ
υ
ψ
N
log-likelihood

Estimate

Std
error

0.006
-0.915
0.918*
-0.712**
1.207
-2.274
-0.275
0.213

0.033
0.670
0.487
0.332
0.853
1.528
0.525
1.106

0.165***
0.311***
0.306***
47310
-27526.615

0.007
0.056
0.023

Results account for clustering at the individual level
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table E2
Intertemporal Risk Preference ML Estimates
EUT, Exponential Discounting
Smoking Intensity: Number of Cigarettes Smoked per Day
Model 1
Male

Atemporal risk preference parameter (r)
Age
White
Financial situation
Staff member
Number of cigarettes
Constant
Discounting parameter (δ)
Age
White
Financial situation
Staff member
Number of cigarettes
Constant
Intertemporal risk preference parameter (ρ)
Age
White
Financial situation
Staff member
Number of cigarettes
Constant
Error terms
μ
υ
ψ
N
log-likelihood

Estimate

Std
error

Estimate

Std
error

-0.002
-0.020
-0.005
0.038
0.005**
0.540***

0.002
0.027
0.011
0.046
0.002
0.071

-0.001
0.015
0.009
0.017
0.005*
0.345***

0.001
0.023
0.010
0.028
0.002
0.043

0.003
-0.417**
-0.242***
-0.154
0.049**
1.702***

0.010
0.179
0.091
0.254
0.019
0.368

-0.001
-0.170*
-0.114**
-0.116
0.026***
1.020***

0.004
0.094
0.058
0.122
0.010
0.222

-0.034

0.033

0.059

-0.235
-0.228
0.911
-0.053*
1.344

0.378
0.203
0.681
0.029
0.921

0.037
23.331***
-1.207*
1.443
0.115
-1.014

0.155***
0.523***
0.233***
20900
11933.148

0.009
0.159
0.023

0.176***
0.191***
0.351***
26410
15477.688

0.011
0.039
0.030

Results account for clustering at the individual level
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Model 2
Female

3.991
0.706
1.652
0.078
1.605

Table E3
Intertemporal Risk Preference ML Estimates
EUT, Exponential Discounting
Smoking Severity: Fagerström Test for Cigarette Dependence

Atemporal risk preference parameter (r)
Age
White
Financial situation
Staff member
FTCD score
Constant
Discounting parameter (δ)
Age
White
Financial situation
Staff member
FTCD score
Constant
Intertemporal risk preference parameter (ρ)
Age
White
Financial situation
Staff member
FTCD score
Constant
Error terms
μ
υ
ψ
N
log-likelihood

Model 1
Male
Estimate
Std error

Model 2
Female
Estimate
Std error

0.005
-0.015
-0.029**
0.011
0.001
0.449***

0.005
0.037
0.012
0.051
0.007
0.118

-0.004**
0.067
-0.012
0.045
0.001
0.483***

0.002
0.059
0.014
0.042
0.008
0.078

0.031
-0.340
-0.174
-0.022
0.054
0.893

0.040
0.255
0.140
0.455
0.056
0.931

-0.004
0.083
-0.066
-0.344*
-0.007
1.287***

0.008
0.273
0.090
0.204
0.034
0.379

-0.039
-0.411
-0.901**
0.942
-0.376*
3.490*

0.097
1.274
0.391
1.217
0.194
1.948

0.048
1.407
-0.623
0.120
0.608
-2.856

0.133
1.910
0.772
2.750
0.598
4.622

0.169***
0.328**
0.254***
9120
-5006.841

0.014
0.147
0.050

0.165***
0.168***
0.250***
8170
-4513.919

0.014
0.051
0.068

Results account for clustering at the individual level
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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